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INTRODUCTION 
Financial  deregulation  is widely  understood  to have 
important  economic  benefits  for  microeconomic 
reasons.  Since  Adam  Smith,  economists  have  pro- 
vided  arguments  and evidence  that  unfettered  private 
markets  yield  outcomes  that  are  superior  to  public 
sector  alternatives.  But financial  regulations-specific 
rules  and  overall  structures-are  sometimes  justified 
on macroeconomic  grounds.  This  paper  analyzes  the 
need  for financial  regulations  in the  implementation 
of  central  bank  policy.  Dividing  the  actions  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  into  monetary  and  banking  policy, 
we  find  that  financial  regulations  cannot  readily  be 
rationalized  on the  basis of macroeconomic  benefits. 
’  This  paper  was  written  while  the  first  author  was  Visiting 
Professor  of Economics  at the  Universitv  of Rochester.  on leave 
from  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond  where  he  is Vice 
President  in  the  Research  Department.  The  second  author  is 
Professor  of  Economics  (College  of  Arts  and  Sciences)  and 
Professor  of  Business  (Simon  School  of  Business)  at  the 
University  of  Rochester.  ‘He  is also  Research  Advisor;  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of Richmond.  We  would  like to thank.  A.  Broad- 
dus,  M.  Flannery,  B. McCallum,  W.  Poole,  A.  Stockman,  and 
seminar  participants  at the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond 
for  valuable  comments. 
Research  support  from  the  American  Enterprise  Institute  and 
National  Science  Foundation  is  acknowledged.  The  paper 
presents  the  results  of research  conducted  as part  of the  American 
Enterprise  Institute’s  project  on  financial  services  regulation.  It 
is a revision  of a paper  that  will appear  in a forthcoming  volume 
providing  a comprehensive  review  of financial  regulatory  policy 
entitled,  Res~fwing  Banking and Fhanckd  L&-rvkes  in Amekca. 
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There  is a consensus  among  professional  econo- 
mists  that  monetary  policy  can  be executed  without 
supporting  financial  regulations.  This  consensus 
reflects  an understanding  of the  central  role  of open 
market  operations.  There  is,  of  course,  substantial 
disagreement  among  economists  concerning  the 
nature  and magnitude  of monetary  policy’s  influence 
on  the  price  level  and  real  activity,  but  this  should 
not  mask  the  broad  agreement  on  the  central  role 
of  open  market  operations  in  the  management  of 
high-powered  money.  Nor  should  it  obscure  the 
general  agreement  that  there  is  an  important, 
unique  role  for the  public  sector  in the  management 
of  money. 
Banking  policy,  as we  define  it,  involves  regular 
lending  and  emergency  financial  assistance  to  in- 
dividual  banks  and  other  institutions.  Many  aspects 
of Fed  lending  resemble  credit  market  relationships 
in the  private  sector.  In  particular,  there  is a useful 
analogy  between  private  lines  of credit  and  Fed  dis- 
count  window  lending.  Fed  regulation  and  super- 
vision  support  banking  policy  in much  the  same  way 
as  loan  covenants  and  monitoring  support  private 
lending.  The  value  of  Fed  regulation  and  super- 
vision,  then,  depends  on the  need  for banking  policy. 
The  Federal  Reserve  is only  one  of many  competing 
entities  in  the  credit  market,  however,  and  any 
rationale  for  Fed  intervention  in  this  market  must 
involve  evidence  of a relative  advantage  for the  public 
sector  or a market  failure  deriving  from  inappropriate 
private  incentives.  Moreover,  banking  policy  may  in- 
fluence  outcomes  in banking  and  financial  markets 
by  subsidizing  certain  economic  activities,  prompting 
the  erosion  of private  arrangements  for liquidity  and 
encouraging  risktaking.  On  the  basis  of  such  con- 
siderations  we  conclude  that  it  is difficult  to  make 
a case  for  central  bank  lending  policy  and  the  sup- 
porting  public  financial  regulation. 
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  1 pro- 
vides  definitions  of monetary  and  banking  policy.  In 
Section  2,  we  consider  financial  deregulation  and 
monetary  policy.  We  begin  by  considering  monetary 
policy  in a deregulated  environment  and illustrate  how 
a prominent  feature  of Fed  monetary  policy,  interest 
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ment.  We  conclude  by  pointing  out  the  irrelevance 
for monetary  policy  of a well-known  financial  regula- 
tion,  reserve  requirements,  given  the  Fed’s 
preference  for an interest  rate  as its monetary  policy 
instrument. 
Section  3  discusses  deregulation  and  banking 
policy.  Again,  we begin  by  considering  a deregulated 
environment.  We  first  describe  the  character  of 
private  borrowing  and  lending  transactions,  and then 
discuss  the  provision  of line of credit  services  through 
the  Fed  discount  window.  We  conclude  by develop- 
ing  the  distinction  between  illiquidity  and  insol- 
vency  as a means  of judging  the  appropriateness  of 
public  line  of  credit  services. 
In Section  4, we discuss  how  monetary  and  bank- 
ing policy  could  react  to  systemwide  banking  crises. 
We  conclude  that  monetary  policy  can effectively  and 
desirably  limit  crises  arising  from  a widespread  de- 
mand  to convert  deposits  into  currency.  In this  con- 
nection,  we interpret  Walter  Bagehot’s  “lender  of last 
resort”  rule  as  an  irregular  interest  rate  smoothing 
policy.  Banking  policy  in contrast  can  do little  to  in- 
fluence  such  events.  Banking  policy  may  have  other 
roles  to  play  in  dealing  with  systemwide  disturb- 
ances,  however,  and  we  explore  these  at the  end  of 
the  section. 
1.  MONETARY  AND  BANKING  POLICY 
Our  investigation  requires  that  we  distinguish  be- 
tween  central  bank  monetary  policy  and  what  we 
have  referred  to  as  banking  policy.  By  monetary 
policy  we  mean  changes  in the  total  volume  of high- 
powered  money  (currency  plus bank  reserves).  Bank- 
ing  policy,  in  contrast,  involves  (1)  changes  in  the 
composition  of  the  asset  side  of  the  central  bank’s 
balance  sheet,  holding  the  total  fured, or (2) regulatory 
and  supervisory  actions  of the  central  bank.’  These 
latter  actions  might  be  described  as  commercial 
policies.  In the  United  States,  however,  central  bank 
commercial  policies  focus  largely  on  the  banking 
sector,  so  we  term  them  banking  policy.2 
r  One  can  easily  imagine  central  bank  actions  that  combine  both 
monetary  and  banking  policy.  An  increase  in  bank  reserve  re- 
quirements,  coupled  with  an  increase  in  high-powered  money 
sufficient  for  banks  to  finance  it,  is  one  important  example. 
The  possibility  of combination  policies  in no way  diminishes  the 
usefulness  of  our  distinction. 
*  Hodgman  (1976)  is  a  good  survey  of  commercial  policies 
executed  by  foreign  central  banks.  In  the  United  States,  com- 
mercial  policies  executed  through  the  credit  market  are  exten- 
sive.  See,  for example,  Bennett  and  DiLorenzo  (1983)  b- 
ment CditAflocation:  W/rereDo We Go From Here?(1975),  U.S. 
When  the  Federal  Reserve  was  established,  its 
principal  goals,  according  to the  Federal  Reserve  Act, 
were  “to furnish  an elastic  currency,  to afford  a means 
of rediscounting  commercial  paper,  and  to  establish 
a more  effective  supervision  of banking  in the  United 
States.”  These  primary  objectives  involve  a mix  of 
monetary  and  banking  policy.  The  provision  of  an 
elastic  currency  is a monetary  policy  of sorts,  since 
it involves  varying  the  stock  of currency  in response 
to  economic  conditions.  The  -other  two  objectives 
fall into  the  category  of  banking  policy.  For  exam- 
ple,  by allowing its inventory  of government  securities 
to  vary,  a central  bank  can  accommodate  variations 
in  discounting  without  any  change  in  the  stock.  of 
high-powered  money. 
2.  DEREGULATION  AND  MONETARY  POLICY 
Monetary  policy  entails  the  control  of high-powered 
money  by  the  central  bank  to  manage  nominal 
variables  like  the  price  level,  the  inflation  rate,  and 
the  nominal  interest  rate,  and  possibly  to  influence 
temporarily  real  variables  such  as employment  and 
output.  This  section  explains  why  financial  regula- 
tions  are  not  needed  to  conduct  monetary  policy 
effectively,  although  their  effects  must  be  taken 
into  account  where  they  exist.  Section  2.1  provides 
an overview  of the  argument.  Section  2.2  discusses 
interest  rate  smoothing,  which  is  an  important  feature 
of monetary  policy  in the  United  States,  and  shows 
that  such  smoothing  does  not  require  regulations.  In- 
deed,  the  practice  of smoothing  interest  rates  essen- 
tially  eliminates  the  need  for  reserve  requirements. 
Finally,  Section  2.3  explains  that,  once  in  place, 
financial  deregulation  would  have  only  minor  effects 
on  the  use  of monetary  policy  for purposes  of broad 
macroeconomic  stabilization. 
2.1  Why  Regulations  Aren’t  Necessary 
There  is a concensus  among  mainstream  econo- 
mists  that  monetary  policy  can  be conducted  without 
supporting  financial  regulations,  in  spite  of the  fact 
that  there  is  not  a  consensus  on  the  efficacy  of 
monetary  policy  or on desirable  patterns  of behavior 
for  the  monetary  authority.  In  this  context  most 
- 
Congress,  Fed’al  Credit Activities  (1984),  and  “The  Federally 
Sponsored  Credit  Agencies,”  in Cook  and  Rowe  (1986).  Federal 
deposit  insurance,  farm  credit  programs,  and pension  guarantees 
also  fall into  this  category.  In  contrast  to  these  activities  Fed- 
eral Reserve  banking  policy  emphasizes  availability  on very  short 
notice,  through  line  of  credit  services  at  the  discount  window 
and  through  daylight  overdrafts  and  float  extended  in  the 
payments  system. 
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being  one  in  which  the  central  bank  has  a  mo- 
nopoly  on  the  issue  of high-powered  money,  but  in 
which  private  markets  are  otherwise  unregulated. 
This  view  is based  on  the  fact  that  currency  and 
bank  deposits  are  not  perfect  substitutes  in making 
transactions.  For  example,  when  payments  are exe- 
cuted  through  bank  deposits,  costs  are  incurred  in 
determining  that  the  payor  has  sufficient  wealth  to 
cover  the  transaction.  Also,  costs  are incurred  when 
securities  are  sold  and  purchased  to  complete  the 
desired  wealth  transfer.  Bankers  specialize  in  pro- 
viding  these  transaction  services.  In  a deregulated, 
competitive  system  they  have  incentives  to provide 
payment  services  at  cost,  and  to  pay  interest  on 
deposits  that  reflects  the  net  return  on their  earning 
assets. 
In contrast,  when  payments  are executed  with cur- 
rency,  costs  are lower  because  the  value  of currency 
is  more  easily  verified  than  the  value  of  a  check 
written  against  a  deposit.  Also,  the  privacy  pro- 
vided  by currency  is an advantage  for  some  transac- 
tions,  since currency  doesn’t  leave  a paper  trail. There 
is presumably  a substantial  set of payments  for which 
the  cost  saving  and  other  benefits  from  using  cur- 
rency  rather  than  deposits  more  than  offsets  the  in- 
convenience  and  interest  foregone. 
The  fact  that  deposits  are imperfect  substitutes  for 
currency  is important  for  two  reasons.  First,  it  im- 
plies  that  the  public  has  a  determinate  real  stock 
demand  for currency  (C/P),  where  C is the  aggregate 
nominal  stock  of  currency  supplied  by  the  central 
bank  and  P is the  currency  price  of goods  (the  price 
level).3  It follows  that  controlling  the  nominal  stock 
of  currency  (C)  and  its  growth  rate  is  sufficient  to 
control  the  price  level  (P),  the  inflation  rate,  and  the 
level  of the  nominal  interest  rate  (expected  inflation 
plus the  ex ante  real rate).4 This,  in turn,  implies  that 
3  A  brief  survey  of  money  demand  theory  may  be  found  in 
McCallum  and  Goodfriend  (1987). 
4 This  argument  is due  to  Patinkin  (196 1). It was  later  empha- 
sized  by  Fama  (1980,  1983). 
Patinkin  pointed  out  that  a  central  bank  must  fix  both  a 
nominal  interest  rate  and  a nominal  quantity  to  make  the  price 
level  determinate.  These  conditions  are  met  if a central  bank 
pays  no  interest  on  currency  and  controls  its aggregate  nominal 
quantitv.  The  mice  level  is determined  as follows.  Because  cur- 
rency  earns  zero  nominal  interest,  the  opportunity  cost  of holding 
it is the nominal  interest  rate on securities.  It is efficient  for people 
to  hold  a real  stock  of currencv  for  which  the  mareinal  service 
yield  just  equals  the  interest  rate.  For  a  diminishLg  marginal 
service  vield  on currency  with  a suffrcientlv  hiah  initial threshold. 
there  is a determinate  real stock  demand  for currency  and a deter- 
minate  price  level  for  any  given  nominal  interest  rate  on 
securities.  The  nominal  interest  rate  on  securities  is  the  sum 
of  expected  inflation  plus  a real  interest  rate  component.  The 
the  banking  system  can  be  completely  deregulated 
without  interfering  with  the  ability  of a central  bank 
to control  nominal  magnitudes  via monetary  policy. 
Open  market  operations  are sufficient  to accomplish 
monetary  objectives.  5  To  illustrate  that  banking 
regulations  are not  essential  for monetary  policy,  con- 
sider  how  a central  bank  prevents  a temporary  in- 
crease  in  the  real  demand  for  currency  from  de- 
creasing  the  price  level.  It simply  acquires  securities 
temporarily  in the  open  market,  providing  sufficient 
nominal  currency  to  satisfy  the  higher  real  demand 
without  a price  level fall. Alternatively,  suppose  a cen- 
tral  bank  wants  to  restore  a lower  price  level  after 
an inflationary  period.  It does  so by  selling  securities 
in the  open  market  to reduce  the  stock  of currency. 
Regulations  influence  the  magnitude  and  timing 
of  open  market  operations  necessary  to  achieve 
specific  objectives  because  they  affect  both  the  supply 
and the  demand  for currency.6  For  instance,  reserve 
requirements  on bank  deposits  absorb  high-powered 
money  made  available  through  open  market  opera- 
tions,  thereby  influencing  the  effective  quantity  of 
currency  supplied.  Alternatively,  by  affecting  the 
incentive  to  substitute  between  currency  and  bank 
deposits,  a prohibition  of interest  on demand  deposits 
influences  the  magnitude  of open  market  operations 
necessary  to minimize  price  level  effects  of changes 
in  market  interest  rates.’ 
2.2  Interest Rate Smoothing 
In the  preceding  section  we emphasized  that  open 
market  operations  are  sufficient  for  a central  bank 
to  manage  the  price  level,  inflation,  and  nominal 
interest  rates.  In  practice  the  Federal  Reserve  has 
employed  monetary  policy  throughout  its history  to 
smooth  nominal  interest  rates  against routine  seasonal 
and  cyclical  variations  in the  demand  for money  and 
central  bank  can  control  inflation  and  thereby  expected  infla- 
tion  by  choosing  a  desired  rate  of  currency  growth.  For  ex- 
ample,  it  can  choose  zero  currency  growth  and  zero  inflation, 
so that  the  nominal  interest  rate  is simply  the  real  rate,  and  the 
price  level  is  constant. 
5 This  point  was  emphasized  by  Friedman  (1960).  Related 
discussions  may  be  found  in Fama  (1980,  1983)  and  McCallum 
(1985). 
6  See,  for example,  the  textbooks  of Barro (1986)  Darby  (1976), 
Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1984)  Gordon  (1987),  Hall and Taylor 
(1985)  and  Sargent  (1979,  1987).  A  notable  exception  is  the 
view  emnhasized  bv  Wallace  (1983)  and  Sareent  and  Smith 
(1987).  I%Callum  (1983),  who  emphasizes  Fhe  medium-of- 
exchange  services  of money,  and  King  and  Plosser  (1986),  who 
emphasize  verification  costs,  may  be  read  as  responses  to  the 
arguments  of  Wallace,  Sargent,  and  Smith. 
7 See  Mehra  (1986),  for  an  analysis  of  how  recent  financial 
deregulation  has  influenced  the  demand  for  money. 
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effect  the  Fed  has  had  on  nominal  rates.  Next,  we 
discuss  the  mechanism  by  which  the  Fed  has  man- 
aged  them,  pointing  out  among  other  things  that 
interest  rate  smoothing  may  be  interpreted  as  the 
means  by  which  the  Fed  has  satisfied  its  mandate 
to  provide  liquidity  to  the  economy.  We  also  note 
that  reserve  requirements  have  not  played  a substan- 
tive  role  under  this  procedure,  although  there  are 
other  procedures  under  which  they  could  play  a role. 
We  thereby  suggest  reserve  requirements  as a can- 
didate  for  additional  deregulation. 
Z.  2. I  Evidence 
The  purpose  of this  section  is to  describe  briefly 
the  extent  to  which  the  Federal  Reserve  has  suc- 
ceeded  historically  in  changing  the  character  of 
nominal  interest  rate  movements.  Consider  one 
measure  of the  short-term  interest  rate,  the  monthly 
average  call money  rate  on  short-term  broker  loans 
in New  York.8  Prior  to  the  creation  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  in  1914,  this  rate  rose  suddenly  and 
sharply  from  time  to time.  For  example,  in October 
of  1867,  after  remaining  between  4.3  and  7.2  per- 
cent  for  the  prior  three  years,  the  call  money  rate 
rose  suddenly  from  5.6  to  10.8  percent.  Although 
this  change  seems  large  by post-war  U.S.  standards, 
similar  episodes  of at least  this  magnitude  occurred 
26  times  during  the  period  between  the  end  of  the 
Civil  War  and  the  establishment  of the  Fed.  More- 
over,  sudden  changes  of over  10 percentage  points 
occurred  with  surprising  frequency,  on  8 occasions 
during  the  same  49-year  period.  In September  1873, 
the  call  money  rate  jumped  from  4.6  percent  in 
August  to  61.2  percent  before  falling  back  to  14.9 
percent  in October  and  5.5  percent  in January  1874. 
Accompanying  these  sudden  upward  jumps  in  call 
money  rates  were  similar-though  much  less 
severe-movements  in  60-  to  90-day  commercial 
paper  rates.  These  episodes  were  distinctly  tem- 
porary,  ranging  from  one  to four  months,  with  many 
lasting for no more  than  one  month.  Needless  to say, 
such  extreme  temporary  spikes  are  absent  from  in- 
terest  rate  behavior  since  the  creation  of  the  Fed. 
Another  distinctive  feature  of the  period  before  the 
Federal  Reserve  was  the  large  seasonal  movement 
in short-term  interest  rates.  For  example,  the  average 
seasonal  variation  of the  call money  rate  from  1890 
to  1908  ranged  from  a  peak  of  +4.6  percent  in 
January  to  a  trough  of  -  1.39  percent  in  June.9 
s  This  series  is  reported  in  Macaulay  (1938). 
9  These  numbers  come  from  Miron  (1986).  See  Clark  (1986) 
and  Kemmerer  (1910)  for  particularly  useful  related  material. 
Generally  speaking,  rates  were  at their  annual  mean 
in the  spring,  below  it  in  summer,  and  above  it  in 
the  fall and  winter.  By the  1920s  the  prominent  in- 
terest  rate  seasonal  had  virtually  disappeared. 
As just  discussed,  broadly  speaking  the  Federal 
Reserve  may  be  said  to  have  smoothed  nominal 
interest  rates  in two  senses.  First,  it insulated  rates 
from  regular  seasonal  movements  in money  and credit 
markets.  Second,  it removed  temporary  spikes  that 
were  prompted  by  recurrent  irregular  tightness  in 
money  and  credit  markets.  For  purposes  of  this 
discussion,  we  may  define  interest  rate  smoothing 
as a deliberate  effort  by the  Fed  to reduce  or eliminate 
temporary  nominal  interest  rate  fluctuations.*0  We 
shall find the  distinction  between  regular  and  irregular 
interest  rate  smoothing  useful  when  we characterize 
Bagehot’s  lender  of  last  resort  rule  in  Section  4.2 
below. 
There  has  been  considerable  controversy  about 
whether  central  bank  interest  rate  smoothing  is feasi- 
ble  in principle  when  the  public  understands  policy, 
i.e.,  when  the  public  has  rational  expectations.  We 
can  see  that  it is possible  by drawing  on the  simplest 
possible  model.  11  The  model  has  three  basic  equa- 
tions:  (1)  a money  demand  function,  (2)  a  money 
supply  function,  and  (3) an expression  equating  the 
expected  real  return  on  nominal  securities,  i.e.,  the 
nominal  interest  rate  minus  expected  inflation,  to the 
expected  real  rate  that  clears  the  credit  market.. 
The  model  embodies  two principles  that  are essen- 
tial to understanding  nominal  interest  rate  smoothing. 
First,  the  price  level  is determined  by a money  supply 
rule, which  provides  a nominal  anchor  for the  system. 
Second,  the  nominal  rate  is affected  by expected  in- 
flation,  which  allows  a central  bank  to translate  price 
level  and  inflation  policy  into  interest  rate  policy. 
Nominal  interest  rate  smoothing  works  as follows. 
The  money  supply  rule  pins  down  the  expected 
future  nominal  stock  of money,  which  together  with 
the  expected  future  real  demand  for  money  deter- 
mines  the  expected  future  price  level.  In  practice, 
central  banks,  including  the  Fed,  have  employed 
10 There  are  actually  a number  of ways  that  one  can  define  a 
nominal  interest  rate  smoothing  policy.  It can  mean  eliminating 
deterministic  seasonals,  as emphasized  by  the  authors  listed  in 
note  9  above.  It  can  mean  minimizing  interest  rate  surprises, 
as studied  bv Goodfriend  (1987a).  Or it can mean  using  monetary 
policy  to maintain  expected  constancy  in interest  ratesas  studied 
bv  Barro  (1987).  Reeardless  of what  nominal  interest  rate  policy 
is’ followed,  however,  the  theoretical  mechanism  by  which  it 
works  is  basically  as  described  in  the  text. 
I1 See  Goodfriend  (1987a). 
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which  amounts  to running  an adjustable  nominal  in- 
terest  rate  peg. ia  To  illustrate  the  process,  we 
describe  the  response  to  the  following  two  distur- 
bances.  In each  case we first ask what  happens  when 
the  stock  of high-powered  money  remains  constant, 
and  then  we  ask  how  high-powered  money  must 
change  to  be  consistent  with  a  nominal  rate  peg. 
A temporary  rise in real money  demand. With  high- 
powered  money  initially unchanged,  the  current  price 
level  would  fall,  raising  both  expected  inflation  and 
the  nominal  interest  rate.  By  assumption,  the 
expected  real  yield  on  nominal  securities  is  un- 
changed.  Therefore,  under  a nominal  rate  peg  ex- 
pected  inflation  must  remain  unchanged,  which 
means  the  current  price  level  must  remain  equal  to 
the  expected  future  price  level.  Hence,  the  Fed 
would  merely  provide  enough  high-powered  money, 
through  open  market  purchases,  to satisfy  the  initial 
rise  in  money  demand. 
A temporary  tie  in the Hairate.  With  high-powered 
money  constant,  the  nominal  rate  would  rise,  real 
money  demand  would  fall, and the  current  price  level 
would  rise.  Under  a nominal  rate  peg  the  necessary 
increase  in  the  expected  real  rate  on  nominal 
securities  would  be achieved  by a matching  expected 
deflation  due  to  a temporarily  high  price  level.  The 
Fed  would  merely  provide  enough  nominal  high- 
powered  money  to satisfy  the  unchanged  demand  for 
real  money  balances  at  the  higher  price  level.‘3 
r*  The  method  by which  the  Federal  Reserve  smooths  interest 
rates  has varied  over  the  years.  In the  1920s  the  Fed  forced  the 
banking  system  to  be  “in  the  window”  for  a portion  of  high- 
powered  money  demanded.  Since  there  was  relatively  little  non- 
price  rationing,  the  discount  rate  tended  to provide  a ceiling  for 
interest  rates.  The  discount  rate  was  raised  or lowered  to adjust 
the  level  of interest  rates,  with  appropriate  adjustments  to  non- 
borrowed  reserves  to keep  banks  marginally  borrowing  reserves. 
In  the  1930s  nominal  rates  were  near  their  floor  at-zero,  and 
in the  1940s  thev  were  oeeeed.  In  the  1950s  and  ’60s  the  Fed 
1- 
used  proceduressimilar  to  those  it used  in the  ’20s.  See  Brun- 
ner  and  Meltzer  (1964).  Explicit  Federal  funds  rate  targeting 
was  used  in  the  1970s.  Similarly,  the  nonborrowed  reserve 
operating  procedure  emploved  from  October  1979  to  the  fall 
of  1982 was  in effect  a noisy  week-by-week  funds  rate  peg.  See 
Goodfriend  (1987b),  pp.40-41.  Since  then  the  Fed  has employed 
a mixture  of borrowed  reserve  and  Federal  funds  rate  targeting. 
Goodfriend  (1987b)  contains  theoretical,  institutional,  and 
historical  discussion  of the  Federal  Reserve’s  use  of an  interest 
rate  policy  instrument.  For  an  analysis  under  rational  expecta- 
tions,  see  McCallum  (198 1) and  “A Weekly  Rational  Expecta- 
tions  Model  of the  Nonborrowed  Reserve  Operating  Procedure,” 
in  Goodfriend  (1987b). 
I3 Empirical  evidence  on the  high-powered  money  and  inflation 
response  associated  with  the  elimination  of nominal  interest  rate 
seasonals  around  1914  may  be  found  in  Barro  (1987)  and  Bar- 
sky  et  al.  (1987). 
A  number  of  important  practical  points  emerge 
from  this  theoretical  discussion.  First,  nominal  in- 
terest  rate  smoothing  is monetary  policy  because  the 
Fed’s  power  to  create  or  destroy  high-powered 
money  through  open  market  operations  is necessary 
and sufficient  for it to smooth  nominal  interest  rates. 
In particular,  no  financial  or banking  regulations  are 
necessary.  Second,  interest  rate  smoothing  is 
clearly  feasible  when  the  public  understands  policy, 
i.e.,  has rational  expectations.  Third,  the  mechanics 
of  interest  rate  smoothing  are  the  same  regardless 
of whether  the  disturbances  are  seasonal  or irregular 
in nature.  Fourth,  since  the  nominal  interest  rate  is 
the  private  opportunity  cost  of holding  high-powered 
money  (as currency  for hand-to-hand  transactions  or 
as  bank  reserves),  the  change  in  the  seasonal  and 
irregular  pattern  of nominal  interest  rates  produces 
a corresponding  change  in the  pattern  of real money 
balances  held  by  individuals  and  banks.  Thus,  in- 
terest  rate  smoothing  is  the  means  by  which  the 
Federal  Reserve  satisfied its statutory  mandate  to pro- 
vide  liquidity  to  the  U.S.  economy. 
Finally,  Federal  Reserve  interest  rate  smoothing 
has  in  practice  made  bank  reserve  requirements 
unnecessary  for  conducting  monetary  policy.  The 
conventional  view,  of  course,  is  that  reserve  re- 
quirements  help  the  Federal  Reserve  control  the 
stock  of money.  This  is the  view  implicit  in the  1980 
Monetary  Control  Act,  which  extended  reserve  re- 
quirements  beyond  member  banks  to  all depository 
institutions.  If the  Fed  were  operating  with  a total 
reserve  instrument,  reserve  requirements  would  help 
determine  how  a  change  in  high-powered  money 
would  influence  the  price  level  and  the  nominal  in- 
terest  rate.  However,  the  Fed  has chosen  to operate 
with  an  interest  rate  instrument,  i.e.,  to  run  an  ad- 
justable  rate  peg.  As  should  be  clear  from  the  ex- 
amples  discussed  above,  under  even  a temporary  peg 
the  current  price  level  is determined  by  the  chosen 
level  of  the  nominal  interest  rate,  the  credit- 
market-clearing  real  rate,  and  the  expected  future 
price  level.  The  Fed  simply  uses  open  market  opera- 
tions  to  satisfy  current  money  demand  at  the  cur- 
rent  price  level.  In  such  circumstances,  reserve 
requirements  merely  help  determine  the  volume  of 
open  market  operations  that  the  Fed  must  do  to 
provide  the  accommodation.  Reserve  requirements 
do  not  help  determine  the  money  stock  or the  price 
level. I4 
14 This  was  true  even  under  the  Fed’s  post-October  1979  non- 
borrowed  reserve  operating  procedure.  See  “A Historical  Assess- 
ment  of the  Rationales  and  Functions  of Reserve  Requirements,” 
in  Goodfriend  (1987b),  pages  40-41. 
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I. 2.3  Financial Deregulation  and 
Stabilization Policy 
Since  the  Employment  Act  of  1946,  the  Federal 
Reserve  has  had  a mandate  to  use  monetary  policy 
to  stabilize  real  economic  activity.  Thus,  a  major 
question  about  ongoing  and  prospective  financial 
deregulation  concerns  its  influence  on  stabilization 
policy.  While  macroeconomic  textbooks  show  broad 
agreement  on issues  concerning  the  nature  of the  de- 
mand  for  money,  there  is little  or  no  agreement  on 
a  number  of  central  issues  concerning  monetary 
policy. 
Traditional  monetarist  arguments  originating  with 
Milton  Friedman  and  Karl  Brunner  hold  that 
monetary  policy  has  a  powerful  but  frequently 
destabilizing  impact  on  economic  activity.i5  From 
this perspective,  monetary  policy  exacerbates  cyclical 
volatility  because  (1)  its  effects  are  subject  to  long 
and  variable  lags,  which  makes  the  timing  of mone- 
tary  policy  actions  difficult,  (2)  it  is  difficult  for 
policymakers  to  assess  promptly  the  state  of  eco- 
nomic  activity  due  to  problems  of  inference  about 
the  dominant  forces  that  drive  the  economy  in a given 
period,  and  (3) the  policymaker’s  focus  on smoothing 
nominal  interest  rates  against  cyclical  changes  in real 
rates  generally  leads  monetary  aggregates  to  be 
procylical. 
Rational  expectations  monetarist  arguments 
developed  by  Robert  Lucas,  Thomas  Sargent  and 
Robert  Barro,  stress  the  distinction  between  unpre- 
dictable  policy  actions  (shocks),  which  exert  a power- 
ful influence  on  real  economic  activity,  and  predict! 
able  policy  responses,  which  do  not.i6  This  group 
argues  that  systematic  monetary  policy  cannot  influ- 
ence  real  activity,  such  as  employment,  real  gross 
national  product,  and  real  interest  rates,  because 
private  agents  rationally  anticipate  the  systematic 
component  of monetary  policy  and  take  actions  that 
neutralize  its potential  effects,  leaving  it to influence 
nominal  variables  only. 
Real  business  cycle  analysts  using  a perspective 
initiated  by Edward  Prescott,  John  Long,  and Charles 
Plosser  deny  any  major  influence  of money,  antici- 
pated  or unanticipated,  on  real  economic  activity.i7 
From  the  perspective  of real business  cycle  analysis, 
variations  in  real  activity  arising,for  example,  from 
I5 See  Darby  (1976),  Friedman  and  Schwartz  (1963),  and  Poole 
(1978). 
I6 See  Lucas  and  Sargent  (1980). 
17  See  King  and  Plosser  (1986)  for  a discussion  of the  relation- 
ship  between  money,  credit,  and  real  activity  in a real  business 
cycle  model. 
changes  in technology,  sectoral  reallocations,  energy 
shocks,  or taxes  and government  spending  drive  the 
monetary  sector,  reversing  the  traditional  macro- 
economic  view. 
Modern  Keynesian  analysts  led by Stanley  Fischer, 
Edmund  Phelps,  and John  Taylor  see a powerful  role 
for  monetary  policy,  even  with  rational  private 
anticipations,  because  the  Federal  Reserve  can  act 
after  private  agents  have  entered  into  wage  and price 
agreements.  From  this perspective,  monetary  policy 
is  a  powerful  stabilization  tool  that  can  offset  po- 
tentially  inefficient  economic  fluctuations  arising from 
variations  in  the  demand  for  money,  autonomous 
changes  in  private  spending,  and  supply  shocks. 
The  disagreement  about  the  feasibility  and 
desirability  of  stabilization  policy,  however,  should 
not  obscure  the  consensus  that  is  apparent  among 
leading  macroeconomists  regarding  the  operation  of 
monetary  policy.  Whether  monetary  policy  influences 
real  activity  or only  nominal  variables,  all agree  that 
it involves  manipulations  of the  stock  of high-powered 
money.  The  major  ongoing  professional  debates  con- 
cerning  monetary  policy  accept  as common  ground 
the  perspective  that  open  market  operations  are  a 
necessary  and  sufficient  policy  instrument.  Financial 
market  regulations  are not  necessary  for the  conduct 
of stabilization  policy  irrespective  of how  it influences 
the  cyclical  component  of  economic  activity.  Not 
only  is this  the  view  of  academic  economists,  it  is 
also  the  view  that  the  Fed  itself  takes  in  practice. 
In  its  early  years  the  Fed  relied  extensively  on  the 
discount  window  as a means  of managing  the  high- 
powered  money  stock,  but  it rapidly  came  to regard 
the  method  by which  it did  so as a tactical  consider- 
ation  of little  fundamental  importance.  In  the  early 
1920s  the  Fed  substituted  open  market  security  pur- 
chases  for  discount  window  loans  as  the  primary 
means  of  adjusting  high-powered  money. 
3.  DEREGULATION  AND  BANKING  POLICY 
Banking  policy,  as defined  above,  has three  dimen- 
sions.  It involves  changing  the  composition  of cen- 
tral  bank  assets  holding  their  total  fixed,  it involves 
financial  regulation,  and it involves  bank  supervision. 
When  executing  banking  policy,  a central  bank  func- 
tions  like  a private  financial  intermediary  in that  its 
actions  neither  create  nor  destroy  high-powered 
money.  Banking  policy  involves  making  loans  to  in- 
dividual  banks  with funds  acquired  by  selling off other 
assets,  usually  government  securities.  In  effect,  the 
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provision  of line  of credit  services  to  private  banks. 
Regulatory  and  supervisory  dimensions  of  banking 
policy  may  be  understood  in  this  regard.  Private 
credit  extension  is accompanied  by  restrictions  on 
the  borrower  to  limit  his  ability  to  take  risks  and  to 
protect  the  value  of loan collateral.  Private  credit  lines 
are accompanied  by ongoing  monitoring  of borrowers 
by  lenders.  Efficient  central  bank  line  of credit  pro- 
vision  likewise  requires  regulation  and  supervision 
of  potential  credit  recipients. 
The  focus  of  this  paper  is  deregulation.  In  Sec- 
tion  2 we  argued  that  banking  and  financial  regula- 
tions were  not  essential  for the  execution  of monetary 
policy.  Here  we  ask  whether  banking  policy  needs 
supporting  regulation  and  supervision.  The  analogy 
between  private  and  central  bank  credit  extension 
drawn  above,  however,  suggests  that  our  inquiry 
into  banking  policy  should  be  somewhat  different. 
If a central  bank  provides  line  of credit  services,  the 
analogy  suggests  that  it  must  follow  up  with  super- 
vision  and regulation  to safeguard  its funds  and make 
sure  its  commitment  is not  abused.  Ultimately  we 
must  ask,  therefore,  whether  central  bank  line  of 
credit  services  to  banks  are  really  necessary  and 
desirable  in  the  first  place. 
Our  analysis  follows  the  strategy  employed  in 
discussing  monetary  policy  in Section  2 by first  con- 
sidering  a deregulated  environment.  We begin  in Sec- 
tion  3.1  by  motivating  and  describing  restrictions 
voluntarily  agreed  to  by  borrowers  in private  credit 
markets.  Section  3.2  explains  the  demand  for  line 
of credit  services  in general,  and  emphasizes  that  by 
their  very  nature  credit  lines  must  be  accompanied 
by  ongoing  monitoring  of potential  borrowers.  Sec- 
tion  3.3  takes  up  central  bank  lending  and  the  par- 
ticular  issues  that  arise  for public  lenders  such  as the 
Federal  Reserve.  To  keep  things  concrete,  we 
discuss  these  issues  in terms  of Federal  Reserve  dis- 
count  window  lending  practices.  We  emphasize  how 
regulatory  and  supervisory  actions  taken  by the  Fed 
to  safeguard  its funds  parallel  those  taken  in private 
credit  markets. 
The  Federal  Reserve  discount  window  functions 
most  importantly  as  a  source  of  emergency  credit 
assistance.  It is a temporary  source  of funds,  available 
on  short  notice,  for  financially  troubled  individual 
banks.  No  one  argues  that  the  discount  window 
should  be used  to prevent  insolvent  banks  from  fail- 
ing,  only  that  the  window  be  used  to  aid  solvent 
banks.  The  distinction  between  illiquidity  and  in- 
solvency  is therefore  crucial  to  the  management  of 
the  discount  window.  First  of  all,  the  feasibility  of 
such  selective  lending  depends  on  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  having  an  operational  and  timely  means 
of  distinguishing  insolvent  from  illiquid  banks. 
Moreover,  understanding  the  economic  distinction 
between  illiquidity  and  insolvency  is  necessary  to 
decide  whether  discount  window  lending  is desirable 
policy  at  all.  We  address  these  fundamental  issues 
in  Section  3.4. 
Our  treatment  of  banking  policy  here  in  Section 
3  is confined  to  routine  credit  assistance.  We  take 
up  the  feasibility  and  desirability  of  monetary  and 
banking  policy  responses  to systemwide  banking  and 
financial  market  crises  in  Section  4. 
3.1  Private Lending and Private Regulation 
Lenders  face  many  potential  problems  because 
borrowers  can  take  actions  that  affect  the  risk  that 
loans will not  be repaid.  Thus,  borrowers  and lenders 
agree  on  sets  of rules  and  restrictions  to  accompany 
loans.  Consider  for example,  a car loan.  The  lender 
provides  the  borrower  an initial  amount  of funds  to 
purchase  a car. The  borrower  agrees  to a regular  pat- 
tern  of  loan  repayments.  But  the  car  loan  involves 
more  than  these  financial  flows.  Typically,  the  car 
is collateral  against  the  borrower’s  ability  to repay  the 
loan,  i.e.,  as part  of the  contract  the  borrower  gives 
up  the  right  to  sell  the  car  for  the  duration  of  the 
loan.  Additional  agreements  may  restrict  other 
aspects  of the  borrower’s  behavior.  For  example,  in- 
surance  against  damage  to the  car is usually  required, 
and the  borrower  may  be prohibited  from  renting  the 
car  to  others.  These  additional  restrictions  further 
protect  the  lender  against  damage  to  the  loan 
collateral. 
It is important  to note  that  restrictions  on the  bor- 
rower’s  range  of  actions  are  ultimately  in  the  bor- 
rower’s  interest,  since  they  lower  the  cost  of the  loan. 
For  example,  suppose  that  one  wanted  to  borrow 
funds  for  a vacation,  and  owned  a car  without  any 
encumbering  car loan.  It would  generally  be cheaper 
to  offer  the  car  as  security  for  the  vacation  loan, 
although  to  do  so would  require  acceptance  of a set 
of  restrictions  on  use  or  transfer  of  the  car. 
Issues  concerning  incentives  for borrowers  become 
far more  important  and  sophisticated  when  corporate 
lending  is considered.  For  this reason,  corporate  loans 
typically  involve  complex  covenants  (restrictive 
agreements)  that  limit  the  borrower’s  range  of 
actions.‘*  Covenants  that  limit  risktaking  are  par- 
ticularly  important.  For  example,  consider  the  naive 
policy  of lending  to  a corporation  that  is engaged  in 
a specific  riskless  line  of business,  at an appropriate 
I8 See  Smith  and  Warner  (1979). 
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tions  on  how  the  funds  are  to  be  spent.  Ultimately, 
the  loan  is a claim  to  the  minimum  of the  stream  of 
loan payments  or the  liquidation  value  of the  corpora- 
tion’s  assets.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  firm’s 
shareholders  the  risky  project  would  thus  be  a good 
idea:  if it  is a success,  they  will get  the  rewards;  if 
it is a failure,  the  losses  will be  the  lender’s,  i.e.,  the 
bondholder’s.  Thus,  with  managers  of the  corpora- 
tion  responsive  to  shareholders,  the  firm  has  an 
incentive  to use  the  borrowed  funds  to take  on risky 
projects.  This  difficulty  could  be  circumvented  with 
a covenant  restricting  the  types  of projects  that  the 
company  could  initiate. 
3.2  Private Lines  of Credit 
Efficient  lending  involves  the  costly  accumulation 
of detailed  information  about  borrowers,  both  to  sort 
borrowers  into  risk  classes  and  for  the  purpose  of 
designing  covenants.  Like  many  other  economjc  ac- 
tivities,  information  production  is highly  costly  when 
undertaken  quickly  without  development  of systems 
and  experience.  For  this  reason,  lending  is typically 
undertaken  in the  context  of long-term  relationships, 
in which  information  production  can  be  undertaken 
in  a  less  expensive  mariner.... 
One  form  of long-term  lending  arrangement  is com- 
monly  known  as  a line  of  credit.  The  demand  for 
line of credit  services  arises  because  firms  often  need 
funds  suddenly,  as a result  of unpredictable  events. 
For  example,  a  firm  may  discover  a  potentially 
lucrative  investment  opportunity  which  must  be 
seized  quickly.  The  firm  may  not  have  a sufficient 
inventory  of  readily  tradable  assets  such  as  U.S. 
Treasury  bills  from  which  to  raise  the  necessary 
funds.  Furthermore,  the  delay  involved  may  make 
a public  security  offering  ineffective.  In  contrast,  a 
line of credit  arrangement  is designed  to make  funds 
available  on  very  short  notice,  possibly  as a bridge 
loan  until  other  arrangements  can  be  made. 
Alternatively,  a firm  might  develop  a sudden  need 
for funds  after  suffering  a bad shock  such  as a decline 
in sales  or the  unexpected  failure  of a project.  Credit 
lines,  of  course,  are  specifically  designed  to  make 
funds  immediately  available  in  such  circumstances 
too.  The  extension  of credit  in response  to bad  out- 
comes,  however,  is more  troublesome  for  lenders. 
Bad  outcomes  might  provide  information  that  a firm 
should  be  dissolved,  in which  case  the  credit  should 
19 Haubrich  (1986)  provides  a recent  formal  description  of one 
set  of gains  from  long-term  relationships  in financial  intermedi- 
ation.  Benston  and  Smith  (1976)  discuss  why  bundling  of finan- 
cial products  can  be  efficient  in a world  of costly  information. 
not  be  extended.  But  credit  lines  are  valuable  pre- 
cisely  because  they  make  funds  immediately 
available.  Therefore,  lenders  must  protect  themselves 
against  such  contingencies.  For  this  reason,  con- 
tinuous  monitoring  of potential  borrowers  is a par- 
ticularly  important  feature  of the  provision  of line  of 
credit  services.zO 
Lines  of credit  typically  require  the  payment  of a 
facility  fee  either  on  the  full  amount  of  the  line  or 
on  the  unused  portion  to  cover  the  ongoing  cost  of 
monitoring  incurred  by  the  bank.21  Often  the  fee: is 
paid  by  holding  a  compensating  balance  at  t.he 
lending  bank,  i.e.,  a bank  deposit  that  pays  a below 
market  rate  of  interest.  Because  the  compensating 
balance  allows  the  lender  to  observe  the  borrower’s 
financial  transactions,  it  helps  reduce  monitoring 
costs.  In  return  for  the  fee,  the  line  of  credit  re- 
cipient  acquires  an option  to borrow  funds,  up to the 
amount  of the  line,  at a predetermined  interest  rate 
spread  above  a market  reference  rate.  The  size  of 
the  fee  and  the  rate  spread  are  lowest  for  top  bor- 
rowers  and  higher  for  worse  credit  risks.  For  the 
reasons  outlined  above,  credit  lines  usually  involve 
restrictions  and  covenants,  as well  as the  specifica- 
tion  of allowable  collateral,  if any  is required,  should 
a loan  actually  be  taken  down.  Since  such  restric- 
tions  affect  the  riskiness  of the  credit,  they  influence 
the  fee  and  spread:  acceptance  of more  restrictions 
by the  borrower  generally  reduces  the  cost  of the  line. 
Finally,  monitoring  costs  vary.  Monitoring  a  mom 
and  pop  grocery  store  is less  costly  than  monitoring 
a firm  with  many  employees,  offices,  and  product 
lines.  Higher  monitoring  costs  would  also be reflected 
in  a  higher  fee  and/or  spread.22 
Individual  banks  position  themselves  to fund  their 
credit  lines  in several  ways.  Most  importantly,  they 
maintain  good  credit  ratings  themselves  so they  can 
attract  funds  in  the  certificate  of  deposit  market  in 
a  timely  fashion  and  at  relatively  low  cost.23  To  a 
lesser  extent  they  hold  inventories  of  readily 
*O A number  of authors  in recent  years  have  emphasized  monitor- 
ing  as  a  key  function  of  banks.  See,  for  example,  Diamond 
(1984),  Fama  (198.5),  Gorton  and  Haubrich  (1987),  and 
Haubrich  (1986). 
21 Berlin  (1986),  Crane  (1973),  Hanweck  (1982),  and  Summers 
(1975)  provide  descriptions  of various  aspects  of the  market  for 
lines  of credit.  Berlin  documents  substantial  growth  in  the  use 
of  bank  loan  commitments  since  1977. 
22 Hawkins  (1982),  and  Melnik  and  Plaut  (1986a,  1986b)  con- 
tain  theoretical  analyses  of  the  economics  of  bank  loan 
commitments. 
23 See  the  chapter  on  certificates  of deposit  in Cook  and  Rowe 
(1986),  as well as the  chapter  on repurchase  agreements,  a related 
bank  funding  source. 
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which  they  can  sell to acquire  funds  on short  notice.z4 
If  the  need  is  expected  to  be  particularly 
short-lived,  a credit  line  may  be  most  economically 
funded  by  borrowing  Federal  funds.z5 
3.3  Discount  Window  Lendingz6 
Discount  window  lending  is essentially  the  pro- 
vision  of line  of credit  services  by  central  banks.  As 
such there  are important  similarities  between  discount 
window  operations  and private  lines  of credit.  There 
is,  however,  a  potentially  important  difference 
because  a central  bank’s  liabilities  are high-powered 
money.  We  develop  these  points  below  by  describ- 
ing discount  window  procedures  actually  followed  by 
the  Federal  Reserve.  In  particular,  we  explain  that 
while  the  discount  window  is  unnecessary  for 
monetary  policy,  it  plays  an  essential  role  in  the 
execution  of  banking  policy.  We  also  indicate  by 
analogy  to private  credit  lines,  why  Federal  Reserve 
regulation  and supervision  of eligible  borrowers  must 
be  tied  to  discounting.  We  save  our  inquiry  into  the 
desirability  of banking  policy,  executed  through  dis- 
count  window  lending,  until  Section  3.4. 
Discount  window  lending  is the  extension  of credit, 
virtually  always  secured  by  collateral,  from  a central 
bank  to  a private  institution.  In  the  United  States, 
it is lending  by  Federal  Reserve  Banks  through  their 
discount  windows  to  individual  banks  or  other 
depository  institutions  in  their  respective  districts. 
Reserve  banks  can  finance  discount  window  credit 
with  high-powered  money  or  with  funds  obtained 
from  securities  sold  in  the  open  market.  We  de- 
fine  discount  window  lending  that  is  deliberately 
allowed  to  create  high-powered  money  as  unsteri- 
lized.  Under  our  definition,  unsterilized  discount 
window  operations  are,  in part,  monetary  policy.  We 
say  that  discount  window  lending  is sterilized  when 
z4 In recent  years  loan  sales  have  apparently  become  more  com- 
mon.  See  Gorton  and  Haubrich  (1987).  Pave1 (1986).  and  Pen- 
nacchi  (1986).  Though  it  is  not  clear  ‘whether  they’are  being 
used  as  a funding  source  on  short  notice. 
2s  See  the  chapter  on  Federal  funds  in Cook  and  Rowe  (1986). 
r6 The  term  “discount  window”  arose  from  the  following 
historical  circumstances.  In the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  cen- 
turies,  much  of  international  and  interregional  trade  was  fi- 
nanced  with  bills  of exchange,  which  were  short-term  securities 
that  did not  pay explicit  interest.  When  sold  or used  as collateral, 
a security  was  discounted-or  valued  at less  than  its face  value- 
to  provide  a return  to  its  holder.  The  discount  window  was  so- 
named  because  much  of the  Fed’s  lending  in its early  years  was 
done  by discounting.  Hackley  (1973)  con&s  a thorough  discus- 
sion  of the  legal  historv  of Federal  Reserve  lendine.  For  manv 
years  virtually  all Federal  Reserve  lending  has  tak;n  the  form 
of advances  rather  than  discounts.  Hackley  describes  the  shift, 
as  well  as  the  evolution  of  other  aspects  of  Fed  lending. 
it  is accompanied  by  an  open  market  sale  of  equal 
value.  Sterilized  discount  window  operations  are thus 
pure  banking  policy,  with no monetary  policy  implica- 
tions,  since  they  leave  high-powered  money  un- 
changed.  In  this  case  a  loan  to  an  individual  bank 
is merely  substituted  for  government  paper  on  the 
books  of  the  central  bank,  with  no  change  in  total 
central  bank  liabilities,  i.e.,  high-powered  money. 
As we  explained  in Section  2,  open  market  oper- 
ations  are  sufficient  for  the  execution  of  monetary 
policy.  It follows  that  unsterilized  discount  window 
lending  is redundant  as a monetary  policy  tool.Z7 In 
contrast,  sterilized  discount  window  lending  plays  a 
distinctive  policy  role  apart  from  monetary  policy. 
It  allows  a central  bank  to  lend  selectively  to  indi- 
vidual  banks  without  affecting  aggregate  monetary 
conditions.  In other  words,  it enables  a central  bank 
to  offer  line  of credit  services  to  individual  banks  in 
much  the  same  way  as private  banks  provide  credit 
lines  to  their  customers. 
The  1984 report  of the  Bush commission  on finan- 
cial regulation  put  the  rationale  for  Federal  Reserve 
provision  of  discount  window  services  as follows: 
Operation  of the  FRB’s  discount  window  is a vital  element 
in the  public  “safety  net”  supporting  stability  of the  banking 
system.  Particularly  in  the  event  of  difficulties  affecting  a 
large  financial  institution,  the  FRB  must  remain  available 
to  provide  potentially  extremely  large  amounts  of liquidity 
on  extremely  short  notice,  and  it  is  the  only  government 
agency  that  is in  a position  to  provide  this  type  of support 
to  the  financial  system.  (Bluepritfor  Reform: Th  Report of 
the Task &up  on Regdation of Financial Services, p.  49.) 
Earlier  a  1971  Federal  Reserve  report  reappraising 
the  discount  window  stated: 
Under  present  conditions,  sophisticated  open  market  oper- 
ations  enable  the  System  to head  off general  liquidity  crises, 
but  such  operations  are less  appropriate  when  the  System  is 
confronted  with  serious  financial  strains  among  individual 
firms  or  specialized  groups  of  institutions.  At  times  such 
pressures  may  be  inherent  in  the  nature  of  monetary  re- 
straint,  . . . [which  often  has]  excessively  harsh  impacts  on 
particular  sectors  of  the  economy.  At  other  times  under- 
lying  economic  conditions  may  change  in unforeseen  ways, 
to the  detriment  of a particular  financial  substructure.  And, 
of course,  the  possibility  of local  calamities  or management 
failure  affecting  individual  institutions  or  small  groups  of 
*’  Nevertheless,  over  the  years  the  Federal  Reserve  has 
employed  unsterilized  discount  window  lending  extensively, 
together  with  discount  rate  adjustments,  in  the  execution  of 
monetary  policy.  See  note  12. Though  it remains  puzzling,  use 
of  the  discount  window  this  way  seems  to  be  connected  with 
the  use  of secrecy  or ambiguity  in monetary  policy.  See  Cukier- 
man  and  Meltzer  (1986)  and  Goodfriend  (1986).  In  a  similar 
vein,  Cook  and  Hahn  (1986)  provide  extensive  evidence  that 
the  discount  rate  has  served  as  a  monetary  policy  signal: 
specifically,  a signal  of permanent  changes  in the  Federal  funds 
rate. 
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limited  crises  that  the  discount  window  can  play  an  effec- 
tive  role.  . . . (Reappraidof  the  Feakraj  Reserve  Lkcount Mech- 
anism, volume  1, p.  19.) 
The  Federal  Reserve  discount  window  is understood 
and  valued  as a line  of  credit  facility.  Open  market 
operations  are seen  as capable  of handling  aggregate 
monetary  conditions;  sterilized  discount  window 
lending  is valued  for  its  ability  to  direct  potentially 
large  quantities  of funds  to individually  troubled  firms 
on  very  short  notice.  Based  on  our  discussion  of 
private  lending  above,  we  would  expect  the  Fed  in 
its  role  as public  provider  of  line  of  credit  services 
to  impose  restrictions  on  potential  borrowers  and 
engage  in monitoring  as well.  It does.  In the  public 
sector,  however,  these  activities  are known  as regula- 
tion  and  supervision. 
Like  private  lenders,  the  Fed  too  is  concerned 
about  pricing  its loans  according  to  risk.Z8 In  Regu- 
lation  A,  the  Fed  classifies  discount  window  loans 
into  short-term  adjustment  credit,  seasonal  credit, 
and  extended  or  emergency  credit  assistance.  Ad- 
justment  credit  is temporarily  employed  by  banks  in 
good  financial  condition.29  Seasonal  credit  is 
employed  primarily  by  banks  in  agricultural  areas. 
Its  use  is  also  rather  routine.  In  contrast,  emer- 
gency  credit  is longer-term  borrowing  by  troubled 
banks.sO The  discount  rates  on  adjustment  and  sea- 
sonal  credit  are  lower  than  for  emergency  credit 
because  the  riskiness  of a loan  is generally  lower  on 
the  former  than  the  latter. 
The  riskiness  of a discount  window  loan  depends 
critically  on the  collateral.  The  Fed  has considerable 
latitude  as to  what  it  will  accept  and  the  haircut  it 
2s Notably,  although  the  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980 directed 
the  Federal  Reserve  to  price  many  of its  services,  the  discount 
window  was  exempted.  There  are  some  superficial  similarities 
between  Federal  Reserve  practices  and  private  line  of  credit 
pricing.  For  instance,  the  noninterest  earning  required  reserves 
at the  Federal  Reserve  are like compensating  balances.  But there 
is little  evidence  that  the  Federal  Reserve  prices  line  of  credit 
services  according  to each  bank’s  circumstances  with  respect  to 
supervision  cost,  risk  of  insolvency,  or  collateral. 
29  Since  the  early  196Os,  the  Federal  Reserve  has  allowed  the 
Federal  funds  rate  to  move  above  the  discount  rate  for  long 
periods  of  time.  To  limit  borrowing  the  Federal  Reserve  has 
imposed  a noninterest  cost,  which  rises  with  the  level  and  the 
duration  of  borrowing.  In  practice,  higher  and  longer  duration 
borrowine  increases  the  likelihood  of costly  Federal  Reserve  con- 
sultationgwith  bank  officials.  See  Goodfriend  (1983,  1987b)  for 
discussions  of how  this  means  of administering  the  window  has 
been  employed  in  executing  monetary  policy. 
30 For  example,  Continental  Illinois  Bank  borrowed  exten- 
sively  at the  Federal  Reserve  discount  window  from  May  1984 
to February  1985.  It was  in the  window  for over  4 billion  dollars 
during  much  of  that  period.  See  Benston  et  al.,  pp.  120-24. 
will  take.31  Fully  collateralizing  a  loan  with  prime 
paper  such  as U.S.  Treasury  bills  would  make  the 
value  of a central  bank’s  line  of credit  minimal,  since 
a bank  could  acquire  the  funds  by  simply  selling  the 
bills in the  private  market.  A central  bank  could  still 
make  its credit  line  attractive,  however,  by charging 
below  market  rates  or taking  less than  a market  hair- 
cut.  Whatever  a central  bank  might  do  in practice, 
the  point  of the  current  discussion  is to  analyze  how 
a  central  bank  providing  line  of  credit  services 
based  on  imperfect  collateral  would  operate. 
In  addition  to  setting  the  terms  on  which  a loan 
can  be  taken  down,  our  discussion  of  private  lines 
of credit  emphasized  the  need  for  ongoing  monit.or- 
ing of potential  borrowers  by  the  lender.  This  is no 
less  necessary  for  public  provision  of  line  of  credit 
services  by  the  Fed.  A  1983  Federal  Reserve  posi- 
tion  paper  on  financial  regulation  stated: 
Central  banking  responsibilities  for  financial  stability  are 
supported  by  discount  window  facilities-historically  a key 
function  of  a  central  bank-through  which  the  banking 
system,  and  in  a crisis,  the  economy  more  generally,  can 
be  supported.  But  effective  use  of that  critically  important 
tool  of  crisis  management  is  itself  dependent  on  intimate 
familiarity  with  the  operations  of  banks,  and  to  a  degree 
other  financial  institutions,  of  the  kind  that  can  only  be 
derived  from  continuing  the  operational  supervisory  re- 
sponsibilities  . . . . (“Federal  Reserve  Position  on  Restruc- 
turing  of  Financial  Regulation  Responsibilities,”  in  U.S. 
Congress.  House.  Committee  on  Government  Operations, 
House  of Representatives,  99th  Congress,  1985,  p.  235.) 
We  interpret  the  term  “effective  use”  in the  above 
quotation  to mean  that  the  Fed  must  be  able on short 
notice  to  discern  the  financial  position  of a bank  re- 
questing  funds.  Especially  with  respect  to  emer- 
gency  credit  assistance  such  information  is necessary 
to  price  loans  appropriately,  and  even  more  impor- 
tantly,  to  determine  that  the  borrower  is still viable. 
If the  Fed  were  too  lax-in  the  sense  of  lending  to 
excessively  weak  borrowers-it  would  risk  support- 
ing  banks  that  should  be  dissolved.  If  it  were  too 
cautious,  it  would  risk  not  supporting  temporarily 
troubled  but  fundamentally  sound  banks,  possibly 
allowing  them  to  fail  unnecessarily.  Only  by  con- 
tinually  supervising  banks  to which  it has credit  com- 
3r  Hackley  (1973)  documents  the  history  of  legal  collateral 
requirements  in discount  window  lending.  Although  the  Federal 
Reserve  has  wide  discretion  in  what  it  can  take,  it  has  gener- 
ally  required  very  good  collateral  on  its  loans. 
A “haircut”  is a margin  that  is subtracted  from  the  market  or 
face  value  of  a security  for  purposes  of  calculating  its  value  as 
collateral  in a loan  transaction.  For  example,  a  10 percent  hair- 
cut  off  face  value  of  a $100  securitv  would  value  it  as  $90  for 
purposes  of  collateral. 
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on  short  notice.3a 
Beyond  setting  lending  terms  and associated  super- 
visory  requirements,  the  Fed  needs  to  set  eligibility 
rules.  Unlike  a private  firm,  the  Fed  cannot  simply 
choose  its  customers.  The  logic  of  the  quotations 
presented  above  suggests  that  the  Fed  ought  to pro- 
vide  line  of credit  services  to  the  entire  economy  as 
well as to banks.  To  do so, however,  would  obviously 
require  an enormous  allocation  of resources  for regula- 
tion  and  supervision.  Hence,  the  Fed  and Congress 
have  to limit that  commitment  rather  arbitrarily.  Cur- 
rently,  only  Federal  Reserve  member  banks,  or 
depository  institutions  holding  transaction  accounts 
or  nonpersonal  time  deposits,  are  entitled  to  basic 
discount  window  borrowing  privileges.  This  group 
corresponds  closely  to  the  institutions  holding 
reserves  at  Federal  Reserve  banks. 
If this logic is carried  one  step further,  we can better 
understand  the  concerns  of  some  policymakers  for 
maintaining  a  separation  between  banking  on  one 
hand,  and  finance  and  commerce  on  the  other,  and 
for  limiting  access  to  the  payments  system.33  We 
interpret  the  argument  as  recognizing  the  need  to 
limit  the  Fed’s  line  of credit  commitments,  and  the 
regulation  and  supervision  that  must  accompany 
them,  to  a  manageable  subset  of  the  economy, 
namely,  depository  institutions.  Blurring  the  line,  for 
example,  between  banking  and  commerce  would 
make  it difficult  for the  Fed  to do so. Without  a clear 
delineation,  the  Fed  would  tend  to  be  drawn  into 
additional  implicit  commitments  that  it  could  not 
keep.  Further,  without  the  regulatory  and supervisory 
resources  to  safeguard  its funds,  the  Fed  might  have 
to  withdraw  from  providing  line  of  credit  services 
entirely. 
The  argument  for limiting  access  to the  payments 
system  is similar.  In the  process  of making  payments 
over  its electronic  funds  transfer  network,  the  Federal 
Reserve  grants  intraday  credit  to  depository  institu- 
tions  in  the  form  of  daylight  overdrafts  on  their 
3a In fact,  though  Fed  regulations  apply  to  all banks,  it directly 
supervises  and  examines  only  state-chartered  Fed  member  banks 
and  bank  holding  companies.  The  Comptroller  of  the  Cur- 
rency,  for example,  supervises  and examines  nationally  chartered 
banks.  The  Federal  Deoosit  Insurance  Cornoration  does  so for 
1 
insured  state-chartered  non-Fed-member  banks.  Other  agencies, 
however,  make  information  available  to  the  Fed.  Continental 
Minti  NationaL  Bank: Report of An Inquiry into its  Federrol  Super- 
vision  and&tame,  contains  a good  discussion  of government 
supervision  of  banks. 
33 See  Corrigan  (1987). 
reserve  accounts  .34 Because  they  are  imperfectly 
collateralized,  daylight  overdrafts  create  potential 
problems  analogous  to those  associated  with discount 
window  lending.  Though  quantitatively  much  less 
significant,  Federal  Reserve  float  generated  in  the 
process  of clearing  checks  creates  similar problems.35 
Because  the  Fed  does  not  elimnate  or perfectly  col- 
lateralize  daylight  overdrafts  or float,  it needs  to limit 
access  to the  payments  system  to protect  its funds. 
In summary,  efficient  lending,  whether  by private 
firms  or  public  institutions,  necessarily  involves 
restrictions.  If banking  policy  in the  form  of discount 
window  lending  and  the  provision  of  payments 
system  credit  is desirable,  then  it  must  be  accom- 
panied  by central  bank  regulation  and supervision  just 
as private  line  of credit  services  require  restrictions 
and  continual  monitoring. 
3.4  Illiquidity and Emergency 
Credit Assistance 
The  preceding  discussion  indicated  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  discount  window  is most  important 
as a source  of immediately  available  short-term  credit 
to  individaai banks.  As noted  above,  no  one  argues 
that  the  discount  window  should  be  used  to  rescue 
insolvent  banks,  only  that  it  be  used  to  aid tempo- 
rarily  illiquid  banks.  The  familiar  rule  of  thumb- 
lend  only  to illiquid but  solvent  banks-both  protects 
public  funds  and safeguards  the  freedom  to fail, which 
is  vital  to  the  efficiency  of  the  economy.36  The 
purpose  of  this  section  is  twofold.  First,  it  is  to 
evaluate  whether  the  rule  of thumb  can  be  feasibly 
implemented.  Second,  it is to see whether  the  public 
34 See  Mengle,  Humphrey,  and  Summers  (1987)  for  a discus- 
sion  of  daylight  overdrafts.  They  report  total  funds  transfer 
daylight  overdrafts  of 76 billion  dollars  per  day.  This  is an enor-  - 
mous  number  when  one  considers  that  total  reserve  balances 
with  Reserve  Banks  are around  3.5 billion  dollars.  Davliaht  over- 
drafts  are  currently  not  priced.  They  are  interest  ‘f&e  loans. 
Therefore,  depository  institutions  have  little  incentive  to 
economize  on  their  use.  To  limit  somewhat  the  use  of intraday 
credit  the  Fed  monitors  depository  institutions  according  to 
“caps”  and  relatively  informal  guidelines,  resorting  to  consulta- 
tions  with  bank  officials  when  necessarv.  This  is  reminiscent 
of  administration  of  the  discount  windo’w.  See  note  29. 
35 The  Monetary  Control  Act of  1980 mandated  that  the  Federal 
Reserve  charge  fees  to recover  the  cost  of providing  check  clear- 
ing  and  other  services.  In  particular,  the  Federal  Reserve  was 
directed  to charge  for Federal  Reserve  float  at the  Federal  funds 
rate.  Consequemly,  check  float has  fallen from  7.4 billion  dollars 
in the  first half of  1979 to under  1 billion  dollars  todav.  See  “The 
Tug-of-War  Over  Float,”  (1983),  U.S.  Congress,  Th  Role  of the 
Federal Reseme in Ckeck  Clearing  and tke Nation’s  Payments  System 
(1983),  and  Young’(1986). 
36 Todd  (1987)  documents  in  detail  the  establishment  of  the 
principle  that  the  central  bank  should  lend  only  to  illiquid  but 
not  to  insolvent  institutions. 
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count  window  can  be rationalized  as necessary  to aid 
temporarily  illiquid  banks.  The  value  of central  bank 
regulation  and  supervision  hinges  critically  on  the 
answer  to  these  questions. 
To  carry  out  the  analysis  we require  an operational 
means  of  distinguishing  between  illiquid  and  insol- 
vent  banks.  This  distinction  appears  meaningful  only 
in  the  presence  of  incomplete  and  costly  informa- 
tion  about  the  value  of  bank  assets.  If  information 
were  freely  available  about  such  assets,  then  private 
markets  would  stand  ready  to  lend  any  bank  the 
present  value  of the  expected  income  streams  from 
its assets,  discounted  at a rate  appropriate  for the  risk. 
Thus,  any  bank  would  always  be  fully  liquid,  able 
to  pay  all claimants,  as  long  as it  was  also  solvent. 
If information  is incomplete  and  costly  to  obtain, 
then  it  becomes  possible  to  imagine  the  following 
situation,  which  could  be  described  as involving  an 
illiquid  but  solvent  bank. 37 Suppose  that  a disturb- 
ance  arises  which  adversely  affects  the  returns  to 
some  existing  bank  loans.  If the  private  market  can- 
not  distinguish  between  strong  and weak  banks,  then 
it  will  only  lend  to  any  individual  bank  at  a  rate 
appropriate  for  the  entire  pool  of borrowing  banks. 
For  any  strong  bank  needing  to borrow  funds,  then, 
the  private  market  will  charge  a  higher  rate  under 
incomplete  information  than  under  complete  infor- 
mation  because  the  rate  takes  into  account  a prob- 
ability  that  the  bank  is bad,  even  though  it may  not 
be.  Faced  with  a need  for  funds,  a strong  bank  may 
find  itself  in a dilemma:  its loans  maybe  able  to  sup- 
port  the  borrowing  rate  under  full  information,  but 
not  the  higher  rate  prevailing  under  incomplete  in- 
formation.  More  precisely,  at the  full information  bor- 
rowing  rate,  the  bank  might  have  positive  economic 
net  worth,  but  at the  higher  rate  under  incomplete 
information  its net  worth  may  be negative.  We would 
describe  such  a bank  as potentially  illiquid  though 
solvent. 
The  higher  rate  that  prevails  in the  market  is an 
outcome  of  costly  information.  It  is  a  result  of 
pooling  diverse  risk groups,  as discussed  above,  made 
necessary  by  the  costliness  of  auditing  the  under- 
lying  assets  of the  bank.  Timely  auditing  over  very 
short  periods  can  be  so costly  that  individual  banks 
might  not  find  it feasible  to  engage  in “last  minute” 
auditing  as  part  of  a  program  for  raising  funds. 
37 The  analysis  here  relies  on  the  substantial  work  on  private 
information  economies  stimulated  by  Rothschild  and  Stiglitz 
(1976).  However,  since  we consider  costly  evaluation,  our treat- 
ment  of  private  information  economies  is  closer  to  Boyd  and 
Prescott  (1986). 
Credit  lines  exist  to  deal  with  precisely  this  situ- 
ation.  As  described  above,  these  involve  an  on- 
going  relationship  with  periodic  credit  evaluation  so 
that  the  lender  can  distinguish  illiquidity  from  in- 
solvency  in  the  event  of  a request  for  funds.  The 
ongoing  relationship  develops  because  evaluation 
costs  are  lower,  as with  many  other  economic  ac- 
tivities,  when  they  are  distributed  over  time. 
In  operating  a discount  window,  the  government 
faces  the  same problem  as a private  lender  when  there 
is incomplete  and costly  information.  It has the  same 
range  of choices.  It can  lend  to  a pool  of undifferen- 
tiated  risks.  If it were  to pursue  such  a strategy,  then 
to break  even  it would  have  to lend  at a penalty  rate 
equal  to  the  private  market  pooled  rate.  However, 
if the  discount  window  had  to  compete  with  private 
lines  of credit,  such  a pricing  policy  would  only  at- 
tract  insolvent  banks.  Hence,  indiscriminate  lending 
would  be  undesirable. 
Alternatively,  a central  bank  could  supervise,  i.e., 
evaluate,  banks  and  selectively  lend  based  on  the 
information  that  supervision  actually  generates. 
Distinguishing  among  banks  on  this  basis,  a central 
bank  selectively  aids  illiquid  banks,  but  it  incurs 
supervision  costs  to  discriminate  between  types  of 
banks.  From  this  perspective,  it  is not  an  accident 
that  discount  window  lending  and  bank  supervision 
are jointly  included  in the  primary  rationales  for  the 
Federal  Reserve.  If these  supervision  costs  are taken 
into  account  and  they  are  at least  as great  as those 
of the  private  sector,  then  banking  policy  breaks  even 
or  subsidizes  illiquid  banks.  It  could  not  penalize 
illiquid  banks  which  have  the  option  of using  com- 
petitive  private  credit  lines. 
As with  many  other  areas  of government  interven- 
tion,  then,  the  efficacy  of  discount  window  lending 
turns  on the  relative  efficiency  of the  government  and 
the private  sector  in undertaking  a productive  activity. 
We  know  of no  analysis  that  establishes  the  relative 
advantage  of central  banks  in this  area,  though  more 
research  is needed  before  any  definitive  conclusions 
.can  be reached.  Indeed,  in view  of political  pressure 
to  support  large  banks,  it is possible  that  the  private 
market  is  inherently  superior  because  it  may  be 
difficult  for a government  agency  to lend  only  to illi- 
quid  but  not  to  insolvent  banks.38  From  this  per- 
spective,  selective  discount  window  lending  and 
38 Sprague  (1986)  and  Todd  (1987)  report  numerous  instances 
of  government  support  for  insolvent  institutions.  The  Federal 
Reserve  minimizes  the  risk  of  supporting  insolvent  banks  by 
making  discount  window  loans  only  on  the  best  collateral. 
However,  by  doing  so  it greatly  reduces  the  value  of its  line  of 
credit  services  too.  For  example,  it took  the  best  collateral  when 
lending  to  Continental  Illinois  Bank  in  1984-85.  See  note  30. 
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objective  of the  framers  of the  Federal  Reserve  Act. 
But,  in  contrast  to  the  provision  of  an  elastic  cur- 
rency,  it is less clear that  this is an appropriate  govern- 
ment  intervention.39 
We  are  now  in  a position  to  consider  more  fully 
whether  regulation  and  supervision  are  essential  for 
central  banking.  We  emphasized  in  Section  2 that 
regulations  were  not  essential  for  the  execution  of 
monetary  policy.  In  sharp  contrast,  we  have  argued 
here  that  banking  policy  needs  supporting  regulation 
and  supervision.  4o The  reason  for  the  difference  is 
that  monetary  policy  can  be  carried  out  with  open 
market  operations  in government  securities.  But  by 
its  very  nature,  banking  policy  involves  a  swap  of 
government  securities  for claims  on individual  banks. 
Just  as  private  lenders  must  restrict  and  monitor 
individual  borrowers,  so  must  a  central  bank.  As 
indicated  above,  however,  we  know  of  no  com- 
pelling  rationale  for public  provision  of line  of credit 
services  to  individual  banks  through  a central  bank 
discount  window.  The  fiat monetary  system  we cur- 
rently  have  requires  central  bank  management  of 
high-powered  money.  But  today’s  financial  markets 
provide  a highly  efficient  means  of allocating  credit 
privately. On  the basis of such considerations, we 
find that  it is difficult  to make  a case  for central  bank 
lending  and  the  regulatory  and  supervisory  activities 
that  support  it. 
This  conclusion  must,  however,  be qualified  in two 
ways.  First,  it  is beyond  the  scope  of this  paper  to 
analyze  the  benefits  of  Federal  Reserve  credit 
generated  by  the  payments  system.  Provision  of im- 
perfectly  collateralized  daylight  overdrafts  and  float 
also  requires  regulation  and  supervision.  Second, 
we  have  so  far  only  discussed  banking  policy  with 
39 There  is  an  additional  reason  why  government  emergency 
credit  assistance  might  be  necessary.  Private  markets  would  only 
make  arrangements  to  protect  themselves  against  liquidity 
problems  if they  believed  that  the  government  would  not  offer 
such  services.  Yet  it  might  be impossible  for  the  government 
to  make  credible  its  intention  not  to  intervene  in future  crises. 
To  do  so,  the  government  would  have  to  precommit  itself  not 
to prbvide  emergency  credit  assistance.  The  worst  possible  case 
would  be  one  where  the  government  announced  its  intention 
not  to  provide  emergency  credit  assistance  in  the  future,  but 
the  banks  believed  that  in  fact  it  would.  Then  if  a  liauiditv 
problem  arose,  banks  would  not  have  prepared  for it by hblding 
sufficient  capital  and  by  arranging  lines  of credit.  If the  govern- 
ment  remained  true  to  its  policy,  widespread  insolvency  could 
prevail.  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1986)  provide  an interesting  analysis 
of  this  sort  of  problem  with  respect  to  international  debt. 
4o If  the  Federal  Reserve  always  perfectly  collateralized  its 
banking  policy  loans,  then  in principle  it could  need  very  little 
supporting  regulation  and  supervision.  However,  if it lent  at below 
market  rates,  it would  still  need  regulation  and  supervision  to 
see  that  its  policy  was  not  abused. 
respect  to individually  troubled  banks.  We  must  also 
ask  whether  banking  policy  has  a  useful  role  to 
play  in  response  to  aggregate,  i.e.,  systemwide, 
disturbances. 
4.  SYSTEMWIDE  BANKING  AND 
FINANCIAL  MARKET  CRISES 
Distinguishing  between  monetary  and  banking 
policy,  the  previous  two  sections  of  the  paper  have 
analyzed  central  bank  policy  in routine  circumstances. 
Policy  was  analyzed  as  it  might  be  undertaken  in 
response  to normal  macroeconomic  disturbances  and 
in  response  to  individual  bank  problems.  Here  we 
address  questions  concerning  central  bank  policy  with 
respect  to  systemwide  banking  and  financial  crises. 
We  begin  the  discussion  in  Section  4.1  by  de- 
scribing  the  nature  of  banking  crises  in the  United 
States  before  the  establishment  of  the  Federal 
Reserve,  with  particular  attention  to  the  measures 
taken  privately  by clearinghouses  to protect  the  bank- 
ing system.  This  discussion  is then  used  in Section 
4.2  to  develop  the  idea  that  monetary  policy  (pro- 
vision  of  high-powered  money)  and  not  banking 
policy  (provision  of sterilized  discount  window  loans) 
is  both  necessary  and  sufficient  for  a central  bank 
to  protect  the  banking  system  against  such  crises. 
We proceed  to characterize  Walter  Bagehot’s  famous 
lender  of last resort  policy  prescription  as an irregular 
nominal  interest  rate smoothing  policy.  We show how 
Bagehot’s  rule  would  automatically  trigger  high- 
powered  money  responses  to protect  against  the  sort 
of  banking  system  crises  experienced  before  the 
establishment  of  the  Federal  Reserve.  Finally,  we 
compare  Bagehot’s  propostd  rule  to regular  interest 
rate  smoothing  procedures  practiced  by  the  Fed. 
Having  pointed  out  that  monetary  policy  has  an im- 
portant  role  to  play  in  response  to  systemwide 
banking  or  financial  crises,  in  Section  4.3  we  ask 
whether  banking  policy  has  a useful  role  to  play  in 
such  circumstances. 
4.1  Banking Crises Before the 
Federal Reserve 
In  his  History  of Crises  undo  the Nationai Banking 
System, 0.  M.  W.  Sprague  identified  five  banking 
crises  between  the  end  of the  Civil War  and  the  cre- 
ation  of  the  Federal  Reserve.41  Sprague’s  crises 
occurred  in 1873,  1884,1890,  1893,  and  1907.  Each 
41 Kemmerer  (1910),  pp.  222-23,  contains  a  more  extensive 
classification  of  financial  panics  including  more  moderate 
episodes. 
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spikes  of the  sort  described  earlier,  although  not  all 
interest  rate  spikes  were  associated  with  banking 
crises. 
All of these  banking  crises  involved  an  incipient, 
widespread  desire  on  the  part  of  the  public  to  con- 
vert  bank  liabilities  into  currency.  They  were  also 
accompanied  by  a  defensive  effort  on  the  part  of 
banks  to  build  up  their  reserve-deposit  ratios.4z 
Under  the  fractional  reserve  system  without  a cen- 
tral bank,  this widespread  demand  for currency  could 
not  be  satisfied.  Organized  around  clearinghouses, 
the  banking  system  responded  in two  ways.43 First, 
clearinghouses  coordinated  general  restrictions  of 
convertibility  of  deposits  into  currency  while  main- 
taining banks’ ability to  settle  deposit  accounts  among 
themselves  and  to undertake  lending.  Second,  clear- 
inghouses  issued  temporary  substitutes  for  cash, 
known  as clearinghouse  loan certificates.  These  notes 
were  issued  against  acceptable  collateral  as  clear- 
inghouse  liabilities  rather  than  individual  bank 
liabilities.  In  this  way,  clearinghouse  certificates 
facilitated  the  settlement  of  accounts  among  banks 
that  were  mutually  suspicious  of  each  other.  The 
clearinghouse  certificates  were  issued  in each  of the 
crises  discussed  by  Sprague  and  remained  out- 
standing  for  as little  as four  months  in  1890  and  as 
long  as  six  months  in  1907.  Convertibility  restric- 
tions,  however,  accompanied  the  issue  of  clear- 
inghouse  certificates  only  in  1873, 1893, and  1907. 
Because  convertibility  restrictions  prevented 
satisfaction  of  the  increased  demand  to  convert 
deposits  into  currency,  they  involved  temporary 
periods  in which  currency  sold  at a premium  relative 
to  deposits.  For  example,  during  the  restriction 
in  1907,  the  premium  on  currency  over  deposits 
ranged  as high  as 4 percent.  Taken  together,  the  ac- 
tions  of  the  clearinghouses  allowed  member  banks 
both  to  accommodate  a higher  private  demand  for 
currency-by  using  certificates  in place  of currency 
for  clearing  purposes-and  frustrated  it-by  tempo- 
rarily  increasing  the  relative  price  of  currency  to 
deposits.  . 
How  well  did these  measures  contain  the  harmful 
effects  of  banking  crises?  As  calculated  from  data 
4* See  Cagan  (1965). 
43  Clearinghouses  were  associations  of commercial  banks  initially 
established  to  clear  checks  and  settle  accounts  among  member 
banks.  Given  their  central  position  in the  clearing  process,  they 
subsequently  assumed  responsibility  for  overseeing  individual 
banks  and  protecting  the  banking  system  as  a whole.  In  addi- 
tion  to  0.  M.  W.  Sprague  (19 lo),  see  Cannon  (1908)  Gorton 
and  Mullineaux  (1987),  Timberlake  (1978,  1984)  on  the 
behavior  of  clearinghouses. 
reported  in HistoricaL  Statistics  of th  United  States  the 
mean  annual  bank  failure  rate  was  less  than  1 per- 
cent  during  the  period  1875  to  1914.  Moreover,  this 
rate  was  comparable  to  a nonbank  business  failure 
rate  which  was only  slightly  higher.  The  annual  bank 
failure  rate  exceeded  2 percent  in only  three  years, 
1877,  1878,  and  1893.  It exceeded  4 percent  only 
in  1893,  when  it was 5.8 percent.  Notably,  the  failure 
rate  was  1.7  in  the  1884  crisis  year  and  only  .5 
and  .4  percent  in  the  1890  and  1907  crisis  years, 
respectively. 
The  1940  Annual Repoti of  the  Federal  Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation  reports  data on losses  to bank 
depositors  over  the  period  1868  to  1940.  Tbe 
estimated  average  rate  of  loss  on  assets  borne  by 
depositors  in  closed  banks  was  $.06  per  year  per 
$100  of deposits  from  1865 to  1920,  $. 19 from  1865 
to  1880,  $.12  from  1881  to  1900,  and  $.04  from 
1901  to  1920. 
The  relatively  small  losses  borne  by  depositors 
reflected,  in  part,  the  high  capital-asset  ratios  of 
banks,  which  cushioned  depositors  against  loss in the 
event  of a bank  failure.  Lindow  (1963,  p.  2) reports 
ratios  of total  bank  capital  to  risk  assets  from  1863 
to  1963.  The  ratio  falls  from  a high  of  60  percent 
in  1880  to  approximately  20  percent  at  the  turn  of 
the  century,  then  rises  to  about  30  percent  in  the 
1930s  and ’40s  and falls to under  10 percent  by the 
1960~.~~ 
This  discussion  is not  meant  to  suggest  that  bank 
failures before  the  creation  of the  Fed  were  not poten- 
tially very  harmful  to those  involved.  It does  suggest, 
however,  that  even  at their  worst  they  were  roughly 
of the  same  order  of magnitude  as nonbank  business 
failures.  Their  aggregate  effects  appear  to have  been 
reasonably  well  contained  by  the  private  provision 
of  bank  capital  and  by  the  collective  protective 
behavior  of  the  banking  system  by  clearinghouses. 
4.2  Banking Crises,  Monetary  Policy,  and 
the Lender  of Last  Resort 
Our  review  of the  banking  crises  prior  to the  Fed, 
and  the  clearinghouses’  response  to  them,  contains 
these  important  lessons.  From  a systemwide  point 
of view,  banking  crises  were  dangerous  because  they 
were  accompanied  by  a widespread  demand  to con- 
vert  deposits  into  currency  that  could  not  be  satisfied 
under  the  fractional  reserve  system  without  a cen- 
44 Lindow  defines  total  capital  to  include  total  equity,  reserves 
for  losses  on  loans  and  securities,  and  subordinated  notes  and 
debentures.  Risk  assets  are  defined  as  total  assets,  less  cash, 
less  government  securities  issued  by  the  U.S.  Treasury 
Department. 
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ways.  First,  they  made  more  currency  available  to 
the  nonbank  public  by  using  certificates  in place  of 
currency  for  clearing  purposes.  Second,  they  orga- 
nized  restrictions  on  cash  payments  which  reduced 
the  quantity  of  currency  demanded  by  temporarily 
raising  its price  relative  to deposits.  These  measures 
were  clearly  monetary  in  the  sense  that  they  re- 
sponded  to  temporarily  high  real  demands  for  cur- 
rency  with  actions  that  changed  the  terms  under 
which  currency  was supplied  to the  nonbank  public. 
The  evidence  that  the  aggregate  effects  of banking 
crises  appear  to  have  been  relatively  small  supports 
the view that  the  aggregate  difficulties  were  monetary 
in  nature,  since  policies  focusing  on  currency 
supply  seem  to  have  been  sufficient  to  contain 
them. 
The  preceding  remarks  lead  us  to  conclude  that 
central  bank  monetary  policy  would  have  been  both 
necessary  and sufficient  to prevent  the  pre-Fed  bank- 
ing crises.  Banking  policy,  on the  other  hand,  would 
have  been  neither  necessary  nor  sufficient,  because 
the policy  problem  was to satisfy a temporary  increase 
in currency  demand,  and only  monetary  policy  could 
do  that.  Importantly,  the  effectiveness  of monetary 
policy  in this regard  does  not  depend  on whether  the 
Fed  makes  high-powered  money  available  by accept- 
ing bank  assets  as collateral  at the  discount  window 
or  by  purchasing  securities  in the  open  market.  By 
extension,  it  seems  clear  that  the  Fed’s  power  to 
create  currency  remains  sufficient  today  to  contain 
any  aggregate  disturbances  due  to  sudden  sharp  in- 
creases  in currency  demand,  whether  they  result  from 
banking  problems  or  other  difficulties. 
We  can  make  this  point  more  concrete  by  using 
it  to  interpret  Walter  Bagehot’s  famous  recom- 
mendation  that  a  central  bank  should  behave  as  a 
lender  of last  resort.45  Bagehot’s  (1873)  policy  pre- 
scription-summarized  as lend  freely  at a high rate- 
was to fix the  discount  rate  at a level  suitably  above 
the  normal  range  of market  rates.  The  discount  rate 
would  then  provide  an  interest  rate  ceiling,  and 
therefore  an  asset  price  floor,  which  would  allow 
banks,  in the  event  of crises,  to liquidate  their  assets 
while  remaining  solvent.  The  proposal  amounts  to 
providing  a completely  elastic  supply  of currency  at 
the  fured ceiling rate.  Put  still another  way,  it amounts 
to a suggestion  for  smoothing  nominal  interest  rates 
when  market  rates  reach  a  certain  height. 
An  important  point  about  “lender  of  last  resort” 
policy  in banking  crises  is that  in our  nomenclature 
45 Humphrey  and  Keleher  (1984)  provide  a historical  perspec- 
tive  on  the  concept  of  the  lender  of  last  resort. 
it is not  banking  policy  at all.  It  is monetary  policy 
because  it  works  by  providing  an  elastic  supply  of 
high-powered  money  to accommodate  precautionary 
demands  to  convert  deposits  into  currency.  Further, 
central  bank  lending,  in the  sense  of advancing  funds 
to particular  institutions,  is not  essential  to the  policy 
since  it  can  be  executed  by  buying  government 
securities  outright. 
One  aspect  of Bagehot’s  rule  deserves  additional 
comment.  He  argued  that  the  last resort  lending  rate 
should  be  kept  fixed  above  normal  market  rates, 
making  central  bank  borrowing  generally  unprofit- 
able,  and  minimizing  any  government  subsidies  that 
might  accrue  to  individual  banks.  He  counted  on 
nominal  interest  rate  spikes  accompanying  banking 
crises  to  hit  the  ceiling  rate  and  thereby  automati- 
cally  trigger  the  injection  of  currency  into  the 
economy. 
Bagehot’s  advice  in this  regard,  has  not  been  fol- 
lowed  by  the  Fed.  Rather,  as discussed  in  Section 
2.2  above,  the  Fed  has  chosen  to  regularly  smooth 
interest  rates.  It has done  so either  by using a Federal 
funds  rate  policy  instrument  directly,  or  by  using 
objectives  for unsterilized  borrowed  reserves  together 
with  discount  rate  adjustments  to  achieve  a desired 
Federal  funds  rate  path. 46 In  principle,  regular  in- 
terest  rate  smoothing  could  satisfy  Bagehot’s  con- 
cerns.  First,  it could  be free  of subsidies  to individual 
banks  if  carried  out  by  purchases  and  sales  of 
securities  in  the  open  market.  Second,  it  provides 
lender  of  last  resort  services  which  are  automati- 
cally  triggered  at  the  current  central  bank  interest 
rate.  Of course,  routine  seasonal  and cyclical increases 
in currency  demand  are  also  accommodated  at  the 
same  rate. 
Thus,  Federal  Reserve  lender  of last resort  policy 
and  the  routine  provision  of an  elastic  currency  are 
functionally  equivalent.  Both  are directed  at insulating 
the  nominal  interest  rate  from  disturbances  to  the 
demand  for  currency.  Both  can  be  executed  by 
using  open  market  operations  to  create  and  destroy 
high-powered  money.  Since  both  are monetary  policy 
we  may  extend  our  conclusion  from  Section  2.1  to 
make  the  point  that  banking  and financial  regulations 
are  neither  necessary  or sufficient  for  a central  bank 
to  pursue  effective  last  resort  lending. 
4.3  Banking Policy  and 
Credit Market  Crises 
In  Section  3.4  we  described  how  banking  policy 
could  provide  line of credit  services  to enable  illiquid 
46 See  notes  12  and  27. 
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we  assumed  that  the  source  of  the  trouble  was 
limited.  At  worst  only  a few  banks  were  insolvent, 
so when  line of credit  services  sorted  the  strong  banks 
from  the  weak,  there  was  a negligible  effect  on  in- 
terest  rates.  We  now  ask whether  banking  policy  has 
a role  in general  credit  market  crises  when  interest 
rates  rise.  If banking  policy  is to  have  a role  it will 
be  in response  to  real  interest  rate  increases,  since 
banking  policy  is clearly  an  inappropriate  response 
to nominal  interest  rate  increases  caused  by monetary 
disturbances. 
The  real  rate  is  determined  by  macroeconomic 
conditions,  including  anticipated  changes  in the  state 
of the  economy  and  uncertainty  in future  prospects. 
It adjusts  to equate  aggregate  supply  and  demand  for 
output,  or  what  is  the  same  thing,  to  equate  the 
aggregate  supply  and  demand  for  credit.  For  ex- 
ample,  an  increase  in future  prospects  which  raises 
current  consumption  demand  causes  a rise in the  real 
rate  to  induce  consumers  both  to  save  more  out  of 
current  income  and  to produce  more,  thereby  restor- 
ing goods  market  equilibrium.  Likewise,  an increase 
in investment  demand  resulting  from  a perceived  in- 
creased  profit  opportunity  induces  a real  rate  rise  to 
maintain  goods  market  equilibrium. 
To  investigate  whether  there  is a role  for  banking 
policy  in general  credit  market  crises,  we  consider 
an unexpected  rise  in  the real  interest  rate.  Even  a 
temporarily  high real rate  could  cause  previously  prof- 
itable  investment  projects  to  become  unprofitable.47 
This,  in turn,  would  generate  a rise  in nonperform- 
ing bank  loans,  which  could  create  insolvencies.  The 
role  for  banking  market  intervention  in  such  cir- 
cumstances  is  usually  formulated  as  “lend  only  to 
illiquid  but  solvent  banks,”  as discussed  in  Section 
3.4  above.  But  it  was  argued  there  that  illiquidity 
arises  only  when  financial  markets  cannot  readily 
determine  the  status  of a particular  financial  institu- 
tion.  However,  unlike  firm  or  bank-specific  shocks 
a general  increase  in interest  rates  would  be  observ- 
able  in  financial  markets.  If all firms  were  alike  on 
the  one  hand  and  all banks  were  alike  on  the  other, 
the  distinction  between  illiquidity  and  insolvency 
would  surely  be irrelevant  for real interest  rate  shocks. 
A real interest  rate  spike  per  se could  not  make  banks 
47 Many  investment  projects  involve  the  purchase  of  inputs- 
fuel,  intermediate  goods,  and  labor-today,  but  only  yield 
output  in the  future.  Production  is profitable  if the  current  value 
of  future  output  discounted  back  to  the  present  at  the  real 
interest  rate  is greater  than  the  current  cost  of inputs.  By pushing 
the  present  discounted  value  of  output  below  its  cost  of  pro- 
duction,  even  a temporarily  high  real  interest  rate  could  cause 
a  project  to  be  shut  down  temporarily. 
illiquid  unless  it also made  them  insolvent.  In so far 
as its effects  were  distributed  unevenly  across  firms 
and banks,  of course,  a real rate rise could  cause  some 
individual  banks  to  be  illiquid  but  solvent.  Thus 
aggregate  disturbances  can  affect  individual  bank 
liquidity  in addition  to factors  specific  to a bank.  But 
the  fact  that  an  aggregate  disturbance  is the  source 
of the  trouble  does  not  alter  the  relative  advantages 
of the  central  bank  and private  markets  in providing 
liquidity.  Central  banks  and private  markets  continue 
to face problems  of screening  strong  from  weak  banks 
that  we discussed  in Section  3.4.  Practically,  the  rule 
of thumb-lend  only  to  illiquid  but  solvent  banks- 
could  rule  out  the  use  of banking  policy  entirely.  But 
if banking  policy  did  not  respect  this  rule,  then  it 
could  well  have  important  negative  effects  by  sub- 
sidizing  risktaking. 
We  are  somewhat  uneasy  about  the  implications 
of  our  result.  While  we  think  the  familiar  rule  of 
thumb  makes  sense,  we  wonder  whether  discount 
window  lending  could  be  rationalized  under  a  dif- 
ferent  criterion:  to  prevent  the  disruption  costs  of 
widespread  insolvencies  associated  with  temporary 
real  interest  rate  spikes.  If such  aggregate  disruption 
costs  were  large  enough,  temporary  transfers  to  the 
banking  system  that  could  avoid  such  costs  might 
be  in  society’s  interest.  It  should  be  pointed  out, 
however,  that  a similar  argument  could  be  made  for 
avoiding  disruption  costs  of temporary  insolvencies 
anywhere  in the  economy.  Therefore,  acceptance  of 
the  criterion  for banking  policy  alone  would  need  to 
be  based  on  a  demonstration  that  disruption  costs 
are much  larger in the  banking  sector  than  elsewhere. 
In  any  case,  because  it  would  have  no  effect  on 
goods  supply  or  demand,  banking  policy  could  not 
reverse  a real  rate  rise.  Of  course,  a central  bank’s 
interest  income  could  change  as a result  of banking 
policy,  i.e.,  exchanging  government  securities  for 
claims  on  private  banks.  But  that  fiscal  effect,  per 
se,  would  have  no  implications  for  the  real  interest 
rate.48 
What  banking  policy  could  do is support  otherwise 
insolvent  banks  by temporarily  swapping  government 
securities  for  nonperforming  bank  loans.  If the  dis- 
turbance  were  temporary,  and  the  loans  earned 
nothing  for the  central  bank,  then  the  size of the  sub- 
sidy  would  be  the  lost  interest  on  government 
securities  that  has  been  diverted  to bank  depositors. 
Alternatively,  if  the  loans  defaulted,  the  subsidy 
48 If  a central  bank’s  remittances  to  the  Treasury  changed  as 
well,  and  the  Treasury  adjusted  its  goods  purchases  accord- 
ingly,  then  there  could  be  a goods  market  effect.  But this  would 
involve  more  than  banking  policy. 
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chased  by  the  central  bank.  The  Treasury,  in turn, 
would  have  to finance  the  loss by  cutting  back  goods 
purchases,  raising  current  taxes,  or  borrowing,  i.e., 
raising  future  taxes.  Banking  policy  of  this  sort  is 
clearly  redistributive  in nature,  a contingent  tax  and 
transfer  fiscal  policy.  It  need  not,  however,  repre- 
sent  a subsidy  to  the  banking  system  as a whole  if 
banks  are  taxed  during  normal  times  to  finance  any 
transfers  during  periods  of  high  real  rates.  Impor- 
tantly,  to be effective  at reducing  insolvency  risk,  the 
tax and transfer  policy  would  need  supporting  regula- 
tions.  Otherwise  banks  might  simply  restore  the  risk 
of insolvency  to  its  initially  optimal  level  by  reduc- 
ing capital  accordingly,  or by restructuring  contingent 
liabilities  to  offset  the  transfers.49  Thus  we  have 
another  example  of how  banking  policy  needs  sup- 
porting  regulation  and  supervision  to  be  effective. 
It  must  be  emphasized  that  we  are  by  no  means 
advocating  the  use  of  banking  policy  to  rescue  in- 
solvent  banks  or,  more  generally,  the  use  of tax  and 
transfer  policies  to  rescue  insolvent  firms  in  other 
industries.  In fact,  we  think  there  are  serious  prob- 
lems  with  such  a policy.  It requires  costly  regulation 
and  supervision.  It opens  the  door  to  bank  rescues, 
which  might  be  extremely  difficult  to  limit  in prac- 
tice.  It would  be difficult to choose  when  to intervene. 
And  there  would  be  political  pressure  to  abuse  the 
policy.  Moreover,  it is far from  clear  that  disruption 
costs  associated  with widespread  temporary  insolven- 
cies  are  large.  Last,  the  potentially  perverse  incen- 
tive  effects  of  systematic  banking  policies  are  a 
matter  of  concern.  Designed  to  promote  financial 
market  stability,  they  encourage  risktaking  and  lead 
to  the  deterioration  of  private  liquidity  provision. 
Thus,  they  are  likely  to  lead  to  more  severe  finan- 
cial market  crises,  particularly  if political  conditions 
arise  where  the  anticipated  public  provision  of finan- 
cial  support  does  not  materialize. 
49 This  argument  is analagous  to  those  that  arise  in  consider- 
ation  of the  “Ricardian  Eauivalence  Pronosition.”  which  states 
that  under  certain  conditibns  a substitution  of  public  debt  for 
taxation  will  have  no  effects  on  prices  or  quantities.  Robert 
Barro’s  Macmeconomics  (1986)  provides  an  accessible  intro- 
duction  to  Ricardian  analysis.  Chan  (1983)  provides  a proof  of 
Ricardian  neutrality  under  conditions  of  uncertainty,  stressing 
the  analogy  to  Modigliani-Miller  propositions  in  finance. 
The  ineffectiveness  of credit  policy,  of which  banking  policy 
is an  example,  is well-illustrated  by  the  student  loan  program. 
Student  loans  need  not  result  in increased  expenditure  on  edu- 
cation.  A  loan  may  reduce  the  extent  to  which  families  draw 
down  their  own  financial  saving  or sacrifice  expenditure  on other 
goods  and  services  to pay  for a student’s  education.  Because  loan 
funds  are  fungible,  they  cannot  assure  a  net  increase  in  ex- 
penditure  in the  targeted  area.  The  targeted  effect  would  require 
provisions  in  the  program  to  prevent  substitution  for  private 
outlays  and  to  restrict  access  to  other  credit  sources. 
CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  analyzed  the  need  for  financial 
regulations  in  the  implementation  of  central  bank 
policy.  To  do  so,  it  has  emphasized  that  a central 
bank  serves  two  very  different  functions.  First,  cen- 
tral  banks  function  as monetary  authorities,  manag- 
ing high-powered  money  to influence  the  price  level 
and  real  activity.  Second,  central  banks  engage  in 
regular  and  emergency  lending  to private  banks  and 
other  financial  institutions.  We  have  termed  these 
functions  monetary  and  banking  policies.  Our 
analytical  procedure  was  to  investigate  how  a 
minimally  regulated  system  would  operate  and  then 
to  consider  the  consequences  of  various  forms  of 
public  intervention.  The  analysis  drew  on  con- 
temporary  economic  knowledge  in  the  areas  of 
finance,  monetary  economics,  and macroeconomics. 
Our  conclusions  regarding  the  need  for supporting 
financial  regulation  were  radically  different  for 
monetary  and  banking  policy,  respectively.  We  em- 
phasized  that  regulations  were  not  essential  for  the 
execution  of monetary  policy.  The  reason  is that high- 
powered  money  can  be  managed  with  open  market 
operations  in government  bonds.  By its very  nature, 
however,  banking  policy  involves  a swap  of govern- 
ment  securities  for  claims  on  individual  banks.  Just 
as private  lenders  must  restrict  and monitor  individual 
borrowers,  a central  bank  must  regulate  and  super- 
vise  the  institutions  that  borrow  from  it. 
Virtually  all  economists  agree  that  there  is  an 
important  role  for  public  authority  in managing  the 
nation’s  high-powered  money.  In  contrast,  there  is 
little evidence  that  public  lending  to particular  institu- 
tions  is  either  necessary  or  appropriate.  Banking 
policy  has  been  rationalized  as a source  of funds  for 
temporarily  illiquid but  solvent  banks.  To  assess  that 
rationale  we  developed  the  distinction  between  illi- 
quidity  and  insolvency  in some  detail,  showing  the 
distinction  to  be  meaningful  precisely  because  infor- 
mation  about  the  value  of bank  assets  is incomplete 
and  costly  to  obtain.  Nevertheless,  we  saw that  the 
costliness  of information  per  se could  not  rationalize 
the  public  provision  of line  of credit  services.  Even 
if central  bank  lending  served  a useful  purpose  earlier 
in the  century,  today’s  financial  markets  provide  a 
highly  efficient  means  of allocating  credit  privately. 
On  the  basis  of  such  considerations,  we  find  it  dif- 
ficult  to make  a case  for central  bank  lending,  either 
through  the  discount  window  or  the  payments 
system,  and the  regulatory  and supervisory  activities 
that  support  it. 
Consideration  of  the  use  of  monetary  and  bank- 
ing  policy  in  response  to  systemwide  crises  led  us 
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monetary  policy  could  play an important  role in bank- 
ing  crises  by  managing  the  stock  of  high-powered 
money  to smooth  nominal  interest  rates.  Moreover, 
it  could  do  so  without  costly  regulation  and  super- 
vision.  Banking  policy,  on  the  other  hand,  directly 
influences  neither  high-powered  money  nor  the 
aggregate  supply  and  demand  for  goods.  So  bank- 
ing policy  could  not  influence  either  nominal  or real 
interest  rates.  We  recognized,  however,  that  a role 
for banking  policy  in preventing  banking  crises  might 
arise  in response  to  real  interest  rate  spikes,  which 
could  cause  widespread  insolvencies  against  which 
monetary  policy  would  be  ineffective.  Such  banking 
policy  actions  could  have  social value  if the  temporary 
disruption  costs  associated  with widespread  insolven- 
cies  were  large.  But  central  bank  transfers  to  trou- 
bled  financial  institutions  redistribute  wealth  between 
different  classes  of citizens  at best.  And inappropriate 
incentives  for  risktaking  and  liquidity  management 
might  lead  to  more  severe  and  frequent  financial 
crises  at worst.  Hence,  it is by  no  means  clear  that 
there  is a beneficial  role  for  banking  policy  even  in 
this  case. 
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